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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a recently born asset class, Contingent Convertibles (CoCos), mixing 
features of both debt and equity that emerged in the last few years and that is growing fast in the 
financial markets. CoCo bonds, converting into equity under a certain Common Equity Tier 1 ratio, 
are the regulatory response to the 2008 financial crisis. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 unveiled the fragility of today’s global financial system. 
The high number of bankruptcies and of bailouts of private banks with taxpayers’ money, opened 
the way to new regulatory directives aimed at strengthening the banking system, especially with 
regard to their capital base. The desire to protect taxpayers and to make managers more responsible, 
lead to the beginning of the “bail–in” era, in which banks are saved by their equity and debt holders. 
It is in this contest of regulatory reform, to strengthen the capital stability and reduce banks failures, 
the birth of contingent capital takes place. CoCos, instruments also known as Additional Tier 1 
bonds, are financial hybrid securities issued by banks, which offer the advantages of debt in good 
times and equity in times of financial distress. These securities are imposed to European banks 
through the EU Capital Requirements Directive of 2013 (CRD IV), which is inspired by Basel III 
framework for strengthening the financial system. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the hybrid 
instruments of Additional Tier 1, identifying their key risks from a fixed income investor 
perspective, and to try assessing a framework to come out with a credible “fair” spread that the 
investor will require for accepting bearing all the uncertainty surrounding this particular and new 
asset class.  
Chapter 1 will briefly introduce the reader to the Basel III framework, discussing the main 
interventions of the regulator with a specific focus on the new definition of the capital base and on 
the minimum capital requirements for internationally active banks. In the regulator’s intent of 
improving the capital quality, Additional Tier 1 CoCos, which are the centerpiece of this thesis, 
play the most innovative role. 
In Chapter 2, a definition of CoCo bonds will be given, and all the key features that make 
them a hybrid instrument between debt and capital will be discussed. In particular, after presenting 
their deeply subordinated nature, the risks of coupon deferral, of extension and of conversion will 
be analyzed, pointing out the reasons for the huge uncertainty that surrounds these financial hybrid 
securities and their differences with previous “old style” Tier 1 debt. The key point we will discuss 
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is the loss absorption mechanism and the conversion trigger, which are fundamental for the design 
of CoCos and for which many proposals were elaborated by the academic world. 
Chapter 3 will briefly present some valuation models for CoCo bonds existing in literature 
and will describe the valuation methodology elaborated in this thesis. Most existing models are 
related to Tier 2 CoCos, which have different characteristics with respect to Additional Tier 1 
CoCos, which are the object of this thesis. These models focus only on the conversion feature of 
the securities, which are priced as derivatives instrument. While we think these proposals correctly 
price the conversion risk upon a certain maturity, these models neglect other risks such as the 
coupon cancellation and the extension risk, which are important new features of AT1 CoCos. In 
this thesis we will instead extend the so-called “Rock-bottom spread” framework based on a 
discounted cashflow approach and on credit fundamentals, developed by J.P. Morgan in 2001 and 
adjusted  for old-style Tier 1 by Henriques, Goulden, & Granger (2006). We will adapt this 
framework introducing the different features of new Additional Tier 1 CoCos. 
In chapter 4, we will then test the new framework, which takes into account all the possible 
cash flow scenarios through the empirical rating migration matrix representing all the possible 
financial conditions of the issuing institution, on some hybrid securities recently issued by six 
European Banks.  
Chapter 5 will finally discuss the obtained “rock-bottom” spreads, which are the smallest 
spread accepted by an investor with a fully diversified portfolio, based on his performance target 
and on his view of the credit fundamentals of the institutions. This spread is thus almost market 
independent and we compare it to the one offered by the market to see whether the securities are 
cheap or expensive according to our views.  
The conclusions will restate the assumptions of the model, and highlight its limitations, 
knowing that the aim of this work is not to obtain a “unique” and “correct” spread, but rather to 
present the new and growing asset class of Contingent Convertibles and all the risks they hide for 
a fixed income investor. The minimum spread the investor will accept is derived through a 
discounted cash flow based and almost market independent valuation framework. 
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1 FINANCIAL CRISIS, BASEL III AND COCOS 
Contingent Convertibles are financial hybrid instruments that emerged in the Basel III 
framework, in the aftermath of the last global financial crisis, as a tool to strengthen financial 
institutions’ capital and make it more effective in absorbing unexpected huge losses. This first 
chapter aims thus at describing the regulatory framework in which CoCo bonds were indicated as 
a possible mean of preventing other financial crisis.  
1.1 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 unveiled the weakness and the vulnerability of the highly 
and internationally interconnected financial system, with special regard to the so-called global, 
systemically important banks (G-SIB), which are the ones carrying the highest systemic risk 
(Veiteberg et al. 2012). These banks, also known as systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs), were particularly affected by insufficient capital buffers, and are the main targets of the 
increased capital requirements contained in Basel III (King & Tarbert 2011). 
One of the main reasons the financial crisis in 2008 became so severe indeed, is the excessive 
on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking sectors of many countries. The capital level that 
banks held was thus inadequate, and the quality of its common equity was not such to absorb losses 
and prevent insolvency (Chan & Kenadjian 2014). In addition, many banks had insufficient 
liquidity buffers and were not able to reintermediate the off balance sheet exposures they had in 
the shadow banking system, hence making impossible for them to face the trading and credit losses 
that the systemic crisis had generated. The crisis was amplified by a pro-cyclical deleveraging 
process and by the high interconnectedness of the financial systems, resulting in a market loss of 
confidence with respect to many banking institutions and in a huge contraction of liquidity and 
credit available for the real economy.  
As a direct response to the crisis and to the shortcomings of previous Basel II regulation in 
addressing the capital requirements of globally active banks and in protecting the financial system, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published in December 2010 detailed rules of new 
global regulatory standards on bank capital adequacy and liquidity commonly known as Basel III. 
The aim of the new framework is “to strengthen global capital and liquidity rules with the goal of 
promoting a more resilient banking sector” and to absorb the shocks from the financial sector, 
“reducing the risk of spillover […] to the real economy” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2011b). The drawbacks of the existing framework identified after-crisis analysis were the not 
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effective loss-absorbing function of capital, the failing liquidity management, the inadequate 
governance and risk management of big financial groups (European Commission 2013).  As a 
consequence of these regulatory flaws, a huge amount of public money from taxpayers had to be 
used to bail-out the so-called too big to fail financial institutions and to avoid further systemic 
disease (Chennells & Wingfield 2015). All these problems are addressed in the international 
reference framework of Basel III and are applied to European banks through the mean of the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV).  
In the next paragraph Basel III and CRD IV rules will be reviewed more in detail, focusing 
in particular on the standard requirements regarding capital adequacy, since this aspect of the 
regulation is the one in which CoCos make appearance as instruments for increasing banks’ capital.  
1.2 BASEL III AND CRD IV-CRR 
Basel III and CRD IV-CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation) are the masterpieces of the 
current regulation of the banking and financial system in the European Union. To be correct from 
a legal point of view, Basel III is not a law, “it is the latest configuration of an evolving set of 
internationally agreed standards developed by supervisors and central banks” (European 
Commission 2013). In order to acquire a legal validity, it has to go through a democratic process 
to be transposed into EU or any national law. Specific applications of Basel III principles can be 
slightly modified to fit with existing national arrangements especially by adding higher standards, 
even if the main requirements, which we explain in the next sub paragraph, tend to remain common 
to all the jurisdictions. CRD IV has several correspondent in different jurisdictions, such as the 
“Final US Rules”, approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in July 2013 
(Shearman&Sterling 2013). There exist some differences between the European and the other 
national interpretations of Basel III framework; nevertheless, since we will later analyze some 
CoCo issuances from European banks, the discussion on the capital requirements will be treated 
from the European directive perspective and with respect to the CRD IV. 
The Basel III framework, which, after being published by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, was endorsed by the G20 leaders in November 2010, is the centerpiece of the financial 
reform program coordinated by the Financial Stability Board, and it is composed of both of micro 
and macro-prudential measures. The micro-prudential rules strengthen the resilience of the single 
banks to periods of financial stress and mainly consist in capital and liquidity requirements. The 
macro-prudential reform instead, addresses the systemic risks that can originate across the banking 
industry as well as the procyclical amplification of these risks over time and their shift to the real 
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economy. The two aspects are nevertheless interrelated, since a greater individual resilience 
reduces the risk of contagion and thus of market wide shocks (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2011b). 
One of the priorities of the Basel III framework is to strengthen the quality, consistency and 
transparency of the capital base for internationally active institutions. With respect to Basel I and 
Basel II frameworks, the new standards are raising the total capital ratio to hold and the percentage 
of high quality capital, the highest quality being common equity (King & Tarbert 2011). 
Capital can be defined in different ways. Thus, to have a more accurate understanding of the 
dynamics of the capital requirements under the new regulation, it might be useful to first have a 
clear definition of the capital base. For prudential requirements in banking, the definition of capital 
is more conservative than the accounting one (asset-liabilities), since only capital that is freely 
available at all the times to absorb losses can be qualified as regulatory capital. Moreover, 
according to Basel III, capital will be separated in going and gone concern.  
Tier 1 Capital, the riskiest one, by absorbing losses on a “going-concern” basis ensures the 
continuity of the institution activity, since it provides immediate capital cushion for the banking 
business, preventing the bank’s insolvency. Additional Tier 1 Cocos are part of this first class. Tier 
2 capital is made of subordinated debt and is qualified as “gone-concern” capital, since it protects 
depositors and senior creditors but only when the institution fails, by losing its claims on the 
principal payment. 
The following definition of capital components, will be associated with the capital adequacy 
requirements, which consists of the amount of capital an institution is required to hold compared 
with the amount of assets, to cover unexpected losses. In the CRD IV-CRR, capital requirements 
are computed as a percentage over risk weighted assets. CRR defines how to weigh a certain asset, 
according to their risk. The riskier the assets, the higher the capital an institution have to hold. In 
this computation, both on and off-balance sheet must be accounted. A detailed disclosure of the 
capital components will follow here below (European Commission 2013). 
 Components of capital 
1. Tier 1 Capital (going-concern capital) 
a. Common Equity Tier 1 
b. Additional Tier 1 
2. Tier 2 Capital (gone-concern capital) 
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A more detailed composition of the different capital parts is given here below: 
1. Tier 1 Capital 
 Common Equity Tier 1 
- Common shares 
- Stock surplus  
- Retained earnings 
- Other comprehensive income 
- Minority interests  
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) is the part of capital composed by the purest forms of equity, 
broadly speaking by the banks’ common stocks as well as any other stock surplus, also referred to 
as additional paid-in capital. The instruments belonging to Common Equity Tier 1 are required to 
have some common characteristics. These instruments represent the most subordinated claim in a 
bank’s liquidation procedure; moreover, they have a perpetual principal and cannot be redeemed 
or cancelled by the issuer. Their dividend distribution is at full discretion of the bank and have to 
be recognized as equity under accounting standards. Common shares, which are the main 
component of this type of capital, are a fraction of ownership of the institution, so do not entitle to 
any claim of fixed stream of income but guarantee the participation to all gains and losses of the 
issuing bank. The minimum CET1 ratio that is required by the CRD IV is 4.5%.  
𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
≥ 4.5% 
 Additional Tier 1  
- Instruments that meet criteria for inclusion in AT 1 capital 
- Stock surplus resulting from these instruments 
- Instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries meeting AT1 criteria 
The criteria required for including the instruments in Additional Tier 1 are some equity-like 
features, which make them effective loss absorbing items, guaranteeing the continuity of the 
regular business activity of the bank.  Among these equity-like features, for example, the deep 
subordination to depositors and other subordinated debt of the bank. In addition, these instruments 
must be perpetual, with no maturity, no step-ups or other incentives for the issuer to redeem. 
Additional Tier 1 securities can be callable only after a minimum of five years after the issuance 
and the issuer must not create expectations that the bond will be called. The bonds can be redeemed 
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only if replaced by instruments of the same or better quality, and in any case, the minimum capital 
requirements must always be respected. Moreover, the bank has full discretion on dividends or 
coupons payments cancellation or deferral, and this fact do not constitute an event of default. 
Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have a principal loss absorption 
trough either conversion to common shares or through a write-down mechanism, which activates 
when a pre specified trigger point is breached. The different CoCos we will analyze in this thesis, 
all belong to this loss absorbing kind of AT1 instruments. 
The CRD/CRR IV requires the banks to have, in 2019, when the regulation will be fully 
loaded, a Tier 1 ratio of at least 6%. The regulation also says that, this ratio must be composed of 
up to 1.5% of AT1 ratio, since the CET1 ratio cannot in any case be below 4.5%:  
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
≥ 6% 
2. Tier 2 Capital 
Tier 2 capital is composed by subordinated debt, junior to depositors and general creditors, 
but which intervenes in absorbing losses only in the case of insolvency. Tier 2 instruments must 
anyway maintain some prudential features, like the fact of being unsecured, having a minimum 
five years maturity with no incentives for the issuer to redeem and being callable only if approved 
by the supervisor and if replaced by the same amount of similar capital instruments. The Tier 2 
Capital ratio that a bank has to hold as part of the total capital ratio is up to 2%, knowing that out 
of the 8% minimum Total Capital ratio required, the Tier 1 Capital ratio over risk-weighted assets 
must be at least 6%. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
≥ 8% 
With the changes in the definition of regulatory capital, many of the instruments that under 
Basel II were considered Tier 1 and Tier 2, do not own anymore the criteria for inclusion in Basel 
III capital. With respect to these securities issued before December 2011 (CRR, 2013, Art. 484), 
the new regulation allows the so-called “grandfathering”, meaning that their regulatory capital 
value will decrease by 10% annually until 2021. Banks must gradually replace these “old style” 
securities with new regulation compliant instruments, such as CoCos in the case of AT1 capital. 
The instruments losing the regulatory capital status will later account as funding unsecured 
instruments (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b; Leung et al. 2012). 
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 Additional Capital Buffers 
1. Capital Conservation Buffer 
2. Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
3. Global Systemic Institution Buffer (G-SII buffer) 
4. Other Systematically Important Institutions Buffer 
5. Systemic Risk Buffer 
In addition to raising minimum requirements, Basel III and CRD IV/CRR introduced some 
additional capital buffers, creating a security cushion and forcing institutions to build up capital 
reserves in good times for preventing bad times troubles. 
1. Capital Conservation Buffer 
Among the additional buffers, banks are required to hold a 2.5% capital conservation buffer, 
composed of the Common Equity Tier 1 exceeding the minimum regulatory ratio. In this way, the 
Basel committee indirectly brings the effective requirement of CET1 to 7% (4.5% CET1 + 2.5% 
Conservation Buffer). Nevertheless, banks are allowed to temporarily have lower ratios though 
they are pushed to quickly rebuild the buffer via restrictions on discretionary distributions. These 
limitations in distribution refer to dividends, deferrable coupons, shares buybacks and staff 
bonuses. The extent of the distribution constraints depend on the distance of the bank’s CET1 ratio 
to the regulatory minimum capital requirement. Essentially, a bank having the CET1 very close to 
the minimum requirement will be forced to retain all its earnings in the subsequent financial year, 
while a bank with a high CET1 ratio satisfying the 2.5% of conservation buffer, will have zero 
constraints on distributions. For example, a bank with CET1 of 8% but with no Additional Tier 1 
nor Tier 2 instruments will meet the minimum capital requirements but, having zero conservation 
buffer, will be imposed of restrictions on its discretionary distributions. Minimum capital 
conservation standards are reported in Table 1. 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio Minimum Capital conservation Ratios 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.125% 100% 
>5.125% - 5.75% 80% 
>5.75% - 6.375% 60% 
>6.375% - 7.0% 40% 
>7.0% 0% 
Table 1. Minimum Capital Conservation Ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b) 
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2. Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
Losses that occur in a downturn preceded by a period of strong credit growth can be 
extremely large and destabilize the entire financial system. This because the easily availability of 
loans at low rates, pushes up private investments and prices, often leading to asset bubbles. When 
the bubble then eventually burst, prices go down, loans start defaulting and bank limit their lending 
activity. The contraction of credit further reduces prices and defaulting loans increase. The 
financial distress reverberate thus on the real economy and turns back to the financial sector in a 
self-perpetrating vicious circle.  
In order to prevent this diabolic loop, the CRD IV-CRR introduces a new countercyclical 
capital buffer, which forces banks to accumulate additional capital in times of economic prosperity. 
This policy aims at reducing credit availability during times of credit growth to provide banks with 
more capital to face times of distress, reducing the extent of  credit crunch during a downturn (King 
& Tarbert 2011). This buffer requirement addresses the risks deriving from the macro-financial 
environment in which the bank operates. When the national authorities judge credit growth 
excessive and associated with a system-wide risk, they can impose banks to hold this 
countercyclical buffer ranging from zero to 2.5%. The amount of this buffer depends on the 
financial stability conditions of the jurisdiction and on the weighted average of buffers deployed in 
all the other jurisdictions in which the internationally active institutions have credit exposures. 
When the authorities consider the risk is over, the buffer requirement can simply be removed. As 
before, banks not complying with the requirements can face distribution limits, according to the 
CET1 ratios. Table 2 indicates the minimum capital conservation standards for a bank subject to a 
2.5% countercyclical requirement. 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
(including other fully loss absorbing capital) 
Minimum Capital conservation Ratios 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.75% 100% 
>5.75% - 7.0% 80% 
>7.0% - 8.25% 60% 
>8.25% - 9.5% 40% 
>9.5% 0% 
Table 2. Minimum Capital conservation Ratios with countercyclical capital buffers (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2011b) 
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3. Global Systemic Institution Buffer (G-SII buffer) 
The CRD IV includes a mandatory systemic buffer for banks that are considered globally 
systemically important. The amount of the required buffer will be between 1% and 3.5% CET1 on 
RWAs and will be applied starting in January 2016. This surcharge is motivated by the high risk 
that these banks present for systemic stability, which would otherwise be restored with taxpayers’ 
money. The Financial Stability Board has listed 28 G-SIFI banks including 14 EU institutions. 
4. Other Systematically Important Institutions Buffer 
In addition to G SII buffer, CRD IV set a supervisory option on other systemically important 
institutions that are domestically important or EU important. The criteria for identification include 
a notification procedure and there is an upper limit to the buffer size, equal to 2% on RWAs. 
5. Systemic Risk Buffer 
According to CRD IV, other systemic risk buffer can be introduced by each Member State 
in order to prevent non-cyclical systemic or macro-prudential risk for the real economy in the 
specific State. Starting in 2015 the Member State willing to set a buffer rate between 3 and 5% will 
have to notify the EU banking authorities. The EU Commission will have to agree on the measure.  
 Pillar II Capital 
In addition to the capital requirements coming from the Pillar I, art. 97 and 104 of Directive 
2013/36/EU 5 (CRD) establishes that Member States must ensure that competent authorities are 
empowered, among others, to require banks to hold additional own funds requirement (Pillar II 
capital). The amount of additional own funds is assessed by the authorities through the supervisory 
review and evaluation process (SREP). This process is a risk management and governance control 
over single institutions, which can end up in the requirement of an additional buffer ranging from 
zero to 2% (European Union 2013; Bank of England 2014; European Banking Authority 2015). 
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The capital adequacy requirements, the regulatory additional capital buffers discussed in this 
chapter and their size are represented in the following Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another important aspect to consider about capital requirements is the way in which they 
will be phased-in to reach the fully loaded regulation in 2019. The gradual implementations of 
requirements allows banks to take the measures to be compliant with the law as stated in Table 3. 
 Capital adequacy phase-in arrangements 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Common Equity Tier 1 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Capital Conservation Buffer - - - 0.625% 1.25% 1.875% 2.5% 
Minimum CET1 + Buffer 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.0% 
Minimum Tier 1 Capital 4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 
Minimum Total Capital 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Minimum Total capital + 
Conservation Buffer 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.5% 
Table 3. From Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2011). 
Figure 1. Capital base and additional buffers under the CRD IV. From (European Commission 2013) 
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Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital are not explicitly showed in the table above, but are 
included in the minimum Tier 1 Capital and in the minimum Total Capital ratio whose phase-in 
arrangements from 2013 to 2019 can be seen in the graphical representation below. 
Understanding the regulatory capital and buffer requirements is very important for an 
investor analyzing the hidden risks embedded in Contingent capital securities. As we will see in 
chapter 2 indeed, many features of CoCos having an impact on the expected value of the securities, 
are directly linked to the breach of some of the just presented capital requirements.  
1.3 THE EXPANSION OF COCO MARKET 
In order to accomplish their regulatory “mission” of enhancing financial stability of banking 
institutions, Cocos must be appreciated and bought by the investors. It seems thus interesting to 
analyze the market of CoCos, to see what factors could help its development and growth. 
 The issuers perspective 
The first driver for CoCo expansion comes from the supply side, since the phasing-in of the 
Basel III and of CRD IV in Europe, is pushing a strong recapitalization of the banking sector. The 
growing requirement of Equity Tier 1 and the possibility to fill the regulatory buffers with up to 
1.5% Additional Tier 1 provides incentives to European banks to issue a huge amount of these 
CoCos and the market growth is expected to continue in the following years (Henderson Global 
Investors 2014). The rationale for bank’s preference of AT1 with respect to equity is in the cost of 
funding. Thanks to the tax deductibility of coupon payments, CoCos, which are considered as debt 
on an accounting basis, represent a more cost-effective capital instrument than common equity. 
Figure 2. Phase-in arrangements Basel III capital requirement. Source (Auer & Von Pfoestl 2012) 
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This seems to offset the high coupon that banks are forced to pay to the investors to compensate 
for the riskiness of this type of securities. 
 The investors perspective 
On the investors’ side, great appetite for CoCos was showed in the two last financial years. 
This can be explained by the low rate environment characterizing the markets as a consequence of 
central bankers expansionary policies aimed at boosting economic recovery. Almost ten year of 
very low federal fund rates and the recent Quantitative Easing from the European Central Bank, 
generated a low returns market with very little options for investors seeking higher yield. CoCos 
are providing high yields in a low yield environment. In 2014, for instance their yield normally 
ranged from 4.5% to 10% depending on issuer and on the security structure, which is quite high 
compared with an average yield of around only 4-4.5% for the European high yield sector 
(Muenstermann 2014). This is why the appearance of this new asset class was welcomed by the 
market. The initial fears, regarding the opacity of AT1 with respect to their accounting and taxing 
rules, due to their ambiguous hybrid nature, are being overcome as the regulation is getting better 
known and as the credit quality of the banks is improving, thanks to the huge recapitalization effort.  
Given these discussed factors, namely the active supply from banks and the global low yield 
environment, the buyer base and thus the market for Additional Tier 1 bonds is expected to grow 
fast in the next five years (J.P.Morgan 2015). 
 Rating CoCos 
Another factor that help boosting bonds market growth is the credit rating attribution from 
the agencies. Initially, rating agencies have been reluctant about rating CoCos for the high 
uncertainties surrounding the asset class. For instance, the heterogeneity of their regulatory 
treatment across jurisdictions makes it more difficult to create consistent rating methodologies. In 
addition, the presence of discretionary triggers and of the Point-Of-Non-Viability (PONV), which 
is declared by the government and imposes automatic conversion of the bond, further complicates 
the rating attribution. Nevertheless, the growth of this market and pressures from the issuing 
institutions pushed major rating agencies to provide these securities with a rating. Having a rating 
is important for CoCos market growth, since the main buyers of these securities are institutional 
investors, such as pension funds, hedge funds or insurance and asset management companies. Some 
of these funds have strict rules about the kind of assets they can invest in, and giving a rating to 
AT1 bonds widens the potential buyer’s base. The ratings are generally given by downgrading the 
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senior rating of four notches, with the possibility of further notching down in presence of high 
coupon cancellation or conversion risk (Avdjiev & Kartasheva 2013; Lambert 2014). 
The factors explained above, allow to predict a persistent market growth, according to J.P. 
Morgan (2015), whose research found that the amount of issued CoCos in 2014 was of USD 97,7 
billion, more than double with respect to the USD 38 billion issued in 2013. The issued AT1 
securities as of April 2015 are estimated around USD 72 billion, assuming a total market size at 
the same date of USD 229 billion. Among the different regions, European banks are estimated to 
account for USD 81 billion and the European market is expected to grow further, being the expected 
issuances valued around EUR 106 billion in the next 2-3 years.  
In the light of what we said regarding regulatory setting and of the growing market of 
Additional Tier 1, chapter 2 will provide a useful deeper look into the different non-standard 
features of CoCo bonds, to provide with more awareness about the risks one has to consider when 
willing to invest in this particular asset class. 
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2 CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS 
2.1 DEFINITION 
Contingent Convertibles, Contingent Capital, CoCos, Enhanced Capital Notes are all 
different names for the same kind of hybrid securities issued by banks to absorb losses when their 
capital ratio falls below a certain level (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2009; Avdjiev & Kartasheva 
2013). They are defined hybrid instruments, since they present characteristics both of debt and of 
equity (Öfinger 2012). Indeed, they behave as plain vanilla bonds, paying a regular coupon rate 
during normal stability times, but they convert into equity when the issuing institution experiences 
a state of financial distress (McDonald 2013; Koziol & Lawrenz 2012).  
Hybrid bonds offer thus both the advantages related to their debt-like features and to their 
equity-like features. As debt, CoCos benefit from the tax shield on coupon payments and thus 
reduce the weighted cost of funding even if, as Rozansky (2010) states, the fiscal advantage may 
vary from country to country, according to the local jurisdiction. In addition, with respect to equity, 
pre-conversion CoCos reduce agency costs because they force the firm to pay coupons, reducing 
the excess cash disposable by management. Moreover, being safer than capital, hybrid bonds avoid 
negative signaling effect of issuing equity (Pennacchi et al. 2011). The loss absorption mechanism, 
allows the issuing bank to promptly recapitalize through an automatic debt-for-equity swap, 
without an ex-post action which would be more costly (since the shares would be issued at a 
significant lower price), and prevents the need for a public bail out (Albul et al. 2010; Flannery 
2009). The conversion or write down of the CoCo’s face value should take place when the bank is 
still a “going-concern”, i.e. when the bank in severe financial distress is still a viable business, 
avoiding bankruptcy without the need of a public bail-out (Goodhart 2010; De Spiegeleer & 
Schoutens 2014a). 
Moreover, since existing shareholders generally do not welcome a conversion, Cocos also 
enhance in another way the financial stability of banking firms. According to D’Souza et al. (2009), 
as stated in Calomiris & Herring (2011), a large size of Cocos with a credible trigger and a high 
dilutive conversion ratio, strengthens the incentive to pre-emptively recapitalize. If these conditions 
are met, an institution getting closer to the dilutive conversion will prefer to issue new equity and 
restore its capital ratio, since this would end up in smaller losses for existing shareholders. For 
these reasons, Cocos do provide incentives to shareholders to keep banks well capitalized, which 
is exactly the regulator goal (Goodhart 2010; Von Furstenberg 2011a) 
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To sum up, contingent capital is intended to effectively reduce the financial risk in the 
banking sector, not only through the automatic recapitalization of banks, but also providing implicit 
incentives to responsibility to managers, bondholders and shareholders (McDonald 2013). 
2.2 ELEMENTS OF CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE BONDS 
In this paragraph, we will present the main elements characterizing contingent capital, in 
particular with respect to the specific new features of Additional Tier 1 instruments as imposed by 
Basel III and by CRD IV of 2013. We will especially focus on the biggest innovation in AT1 
capital, the conversion mechanism. We will review the main proposals expressed in literature, 
discussing pros and cons of the different options for an optimal CoCo bond design. The features 
we are going to illustrate, which also hide the key risks for investors are the subordination, the 
coupon cancellation, the call/extension risk and the conversion feature. 
 Subordination 
The term subordination refers to the order of priorities of claim on assets of the bank among the 
different classes of the asset liabilities.  
Subordination means that in the event of default, the holder of the subordinated debt, must wait 
until the holders of senior or less subordinated bond are repaid, before having the chance of 
recovering some value from their bond. Subordination thus plays an important role on bond’s 
recovery rate, and it is empirically found that, on average, higher seniority is associated with higher 
payoffs in case of bankruptcy. The seniority ranking of the different classes of liabilities is shown 
Figure 3. Life of a CoCo (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2014b). 
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in Figure 4, which represent a simplified balance sheet of a bank.  
CoCos are classified as junior subordinated debt, and their deep subordination is mandatory 
according to the criteria 2 and 3 for inclusion in Additional Tier 1, as stated in Basel III regulation. 
2. “Subordinated to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank 
3. Is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other 
arrangement that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-vis bank 
creditors” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011a). 
The regulators’ intention to make of Additional Tier 1 the most subordinated liability after 
common equity is clear in these two points. In fact, in the case of bankruptcy, CoCo holders will 
become shareholders thus the first absorbing the losses. Although CoCos are moved by the same 
rationale as the bail-in resolution tool, whose application in Europe was introduced through the EU 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of 2014, the two things do not have to be confused. While 
the bail-in is a regulatory procedure for managing banking failures that allows the authorities to 
impose the mandatory write-down on all the bank’s liabilities, (except on deposits and covered 
debt), CoCos are a financial instrument that is converted or is written down on a contractual 
agreement and on a pre-determined trigger event. CoCos are involved in the case of a bail-in 
resolution and can be converted also on a discretionary base by the regulator declaring the bank is 
at its point of non-viability (PONV) like the bail-in debt. Nevertheless, they are expected to be 
written down or convert before the bail-in procedure starts (Patrick n.d.; Chennells & Wingfield 
Figure 4. Simplified balance sheet of a bank. Own illustration 
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2015). Given the deep subordination they have, the expected recovery rate in case of default may 
be expected to be very close to zero.  
 Coupon cancellation 
The rules related to coupon distributions are exposed at the points 7 and 8 of the criteria for 
inclusion Additional Tier 1, as exposed in the Basel III regulatory framework. The aim of these 
criteria is to make CoCos coupon similar to stock dividends with no obligation for the issuer to 
respect the regular payment of the promised coupons.  
7. “Dividend/coupon discretion: 
a. the bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel distributions/payments 
b. cancellation of discretionary payments must not be an event of default 
c. banks must have full access to cancelled payments to meet obligations as they fall 
due 
d. cancellation of distributions/payments must not impose restrictions on the bank 
except in relation to distributions to common stockholders. 
8. Dividends/coupons must be paid out of distributable items” 
According to these regulatory dispositions, the cancellation of the Additional Tier 1 Coupon 
can be either voluntary or mandatory (under certain conditions). 
 Discretionary cancellation 
Point 7 of the inclusion criteria is related to the discretion of coupon cancellation, clearly 
stating that the cancellation of a coupon can be performed at any time from the issuing bank and 
that such choice from the issuer does not represent an event of default. This deferability of coupons 
was already existing in old-style Tier 1 debt under Basel III. Nevertheless, this equity-like feature 
of AT1 debt is further enhanced by removing any kind of limitation on other distribution in the 
case of AT1 coupon cancellation. While these limitations are removed but still allowed in Basel III 
(point 7 d) of the AT1 Criteria), the European Authorities formally prohibit them, as stated at art. 
52 point (1) (1)(v) and at art. 53 (a)(b)(c) of the REGULATION (EU) No 575/2013, (2013). 
The CRR establishes that the coupon cancellation must impose no restriction on the issuer, 
with particular reference to two situations: 
1. there must be no obligation to pay coupons on the CoCo if the issuer pays distributions 
on pari passu or junior capital such as ordinary shares (“dividend pusher”) and  
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2. there must be no prohibition to pay dividends or of other distributions on equal or junior 
ranked capital just because a distribution on the CoCo is cancelled (“dividend stopper”) 
(Welsh & Fried 2011; Leung et al. 2012). 
The removal of the stopper and pusher, might be interpreted as a violation of debt 
subordination principle, since CoCos holder could, in principle, suffer losses even before the 
shareholders. Nevertheless, several issuers clearly state the intent of respecting the seniority of 
CoCos with respect to equity, thus committing to pay the AT1 coupons, or in any case not to cancel 
them in the place of stock dividends.  
 Mandatory Cancellation 
Point 8 of the AT1 criteria, stating that coupons must be paid out on distributable items, refers 
to the regulatory conditions under which a bank may be imposed not to pay coupons. Distributable 
items means the amount of profit from the last financial year plus any profit brought forward from 
previous years and reserves available for that purpose, less any losses brought forward, profits 
which are non-distributable according to the legal provisions and sums placed to a non-distributable 
reserve. Further restrictions for coupon payments through these distributable items, come because 
of the additional capital buffers required by Basel III, as discussed in Chapter 1. As stated in the 
Article 141 of the CRD IV 36/2013, a breach of the combined buffer requirement would impose 
the calculation of the maximum distributable amount (MDA), which according to the severity of 
the buffer breach is a decreasing percentage of the banks’ earnings.  
The amount of combined required buffer varies from bank to bank, since except the capital 
conservation buffer, which is equal to 2.5%, all the other additional buffers’ size varies from bank 
to bank. The sum of these other buffers ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 7.5% 
without considering any additional country imposed buffer. Calculating the distance to the MDA 
trigger or the MDA when the trigger is breached can be useful to make assumption on the 
probability to have the coupon cancelled. 
The computation of the MDA starts by determining the level of the bank Common Equity 
Tier 1, and via the deduction of the Pillar I and Pillar II requirements, obtaining the CET1 
disposable, we can determine through the table 4, the MDA of earnings in percentage. Multiplying 
this the distributable percentage with the profits, we obtain the absolute value of the liquidity that 
the bank is allowed to use for distributions (Kaijser 2013). 
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Available CET1 buffer above PII MDA% 
75-100% 60% 
50-75% 40% 
25-50% 20% 
0-25% 0% 
Table 4. Maximum Distributable Amount. Source: Kaijser, (2013). 
 Extension/callabilty 
This risk is linked to the perpetual maturity of CoCo bonds, and to the possibility the issuer has to 
call back the bond at certain pre-specified dates. This uncertainty is associated to the passage 
from fixed to floating coupon after the first call date, in the case the life of the bond is extended. 
These features are addressed in the points 4, 5 and 6 of the Basel III Additional Tier 1 
criteria reported below. 
4. “Is perpetual, i.e. there is no maturity date and there are no step-ups or other incentives to 
redeem 
5.  May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years: 
a.  To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior supervisory approval; and 
b.  A bank must not do anything which creates an expectation that the call will be 
exercised; and 
c. Banks must not exercise a call unless: 
i.  They replace the called instrument with capital of the same or better quality 
and the replacement of this capital is done at conditions which are 
sustainable for the income capacity of the bank; or 
ii. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum 
capital requirements after the call option is exercised.”  
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011a). 
We can clearly see the regulator intention of making these instruments very equity like in the 
perpetual maturity, and the enhancement of this characteristic of AT1 capital with respect to Basel 
II in the removal of the coupon step-up, which is a clear incentive to redeem that old-style Tier 1 
had. The prohibition for the issuer to generate expectations that the call will be exercised will 
remove the reputation costs as determinants of the call or not choice. This decision instead is 
expected to be based on a purely economic rationale since now on called CoCos must be replaced 
by an amount of the same or better quality of debt. Funding costs and benefits of calling the debt 
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and issue new or instead to keep the existing debt instruments paying the floating rate coupon, will 
be the main focus point for financial institutions at every call date (McCarthy 2014). 
 Loss Absorption Mechanism 
The loss absorption mechanism is the process through which the issuing bank’s equity is 
boosted on the appearance of a trigger event. This automatic recapitalization can occur in two ways, 
either converting the bond into equity shares or operating a haircut (write down) on the bond’s face 
value (Avdjiev & Kartasheva 2013). Basel III requirements are exposed at point 11 of the criteria 
for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital. 
11. “Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal loss 
absorption through either (i) conversion to common shares at an objective pre-specified 
trigger point or (ii) a write-down mechanism, which allocates losses to the instrument at a 
pre-specified trigger point. The write-down will have the following effects: 
a. Reduce the claim of the instrument in liquidation; 
b. Reduce the amount re-paid when a call is exercised; and 
c. Partially or fully reduce coupon/dividend payments on the instrument” 
This feature ensures CoCos perform their fundamental role of providing a readily and easily 
available source of new capital for the bank in times of crisis (Avdjiev & Kartasheva 2013). Related 
to this, two key features are (1) the loss absorption mechanism and (2) the trigger event that 
activates the loss absorption mechanism. Their design must be robust enough to face potential price 
manipulation and speculative attacks (Albul et al. 2010). Several proposals are present in literature 
for Cocos design, focusing on the design of these two key features. All the proposals, which we 
are going to review, make implicit or explicit assumptions on the behavior of the different actors, 
meaning regulators, managers, accountants, investors and markets. All the options present both 
advantages and disadvantages, reason why academics are still uncertain about a recognized optimal 
design model (McDonald 2013).  
 Conversion into shares 
The conversion ratio defines the amount in shares the CoCo holder will receive in exchange 
to the face value of his bond. According to Flannery (2009), the conversion price distributes the 
CoCo’s value between shareholders and bondholders and since this could generate pressures on 
the stock prices, it is important to set a strong and right conversion ratio (Öfinger 2012).  
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The conversion ratio (𝐶𝑟), is the result of the face value of the bond N divided by the 
conversion price (𝐶𝑃). 
𝐶𝑟 =
𝑁
𝐶𝑝
 
If the bond is converted in shares, the loss for the investor depends on the conversion rate 
and on the value of the shares at time of the conversion. 
𝐿𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 = 𝑁 − 𝐶𝑟 × 𝑆
∗ = 𝑁(1 −
𝑆∗
𝐶𝑝
) = 𝑁 (1 − 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜) 
The equation above introduces the concept of recovery rate for a CoCo. The closer the 
conversion price to the nominal value of the share at the trigger date, the smaller the loss. In 
addition, the smaller the conversion price the better off the investor, since he will receive a largest 
number of shares. On the contrary, a small conversion price will damage the existing shareholders 
because of the ownership dilution (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2014a). 
De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2013) identify three methods to deal with the conversion price: 
1. Floating conversion price: 𝐶𝑃 = 𝑆
∗ 
In this type of conversion, that Von Furstenberg (2011) defines as dilutive, the conversion 
price is set at the observed market share price at the trigger moment. Normally, this corresponds to 
a low price, since the trigger takes place in some event of financial distress for the issuing bank. 
The number of shares (X) received after the conversion is computed through the following ratio: 
 𝑋 =
𝑁
𝑆∗
 
The face value of the bond can converted at par, premium or discount. At the date, the 
Additional Tier 1 bonds issued are converted at par. Under this conversion price mechanism, the 
bondholder would not suffer any losses, since he will receive the exact face value in shares. 
In fact, with low prices and the equivalent amount of the face value converted, bondholders 
have a very safe claim, while most part of the brunt of the trigger breach is born by old shareholders, 
suffering from a substantial dilution. The lower the conversion price, the grater the dilution and 
expropriation of existing shareholders and the more likely the disrespect of the subordination 
hierarchy (Von Furstenberg 2011a). Meanwhile, this dilution risk has the advantage of increasing 
the incentives for shareholders to avoid a breach of the trigger (Avdjiev & Kartasheva 2013). 
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According to De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2014), so far no CoCo issuance has this conversion 
method. A Coco with this feature would not be accepted from a regulatory point of view since it 
would not provide true loss absorption and the dilution would be unbounded.  
2. Fixed Conversion Price: 𝐶𝑃 = 𝛼𝑆0 
With this option, the conversion happens at a pre-specified price, which normally 
corresponds to a fraction 𝜶 of the bank’s share price 𝑺𝟎 at the CoCo’s issue date. Establishing a 
fixed conversion number of shares protects existing shareholders from excessive dilution in the 
case of trigger breach. The number of newly issued shares (X) can be found with the ratio: 
𝑋 =
𝑁
𝛼𝑆0
 
This method, which Von Furstenberg (2011) calls anti-dilutive, while providing pre-existing 
shareholders with more guarantees on the dilution phenomenon, sets bondholders in a more 
uncertain position, since they cannot know the amount of the loss they will incur at the conversion. 
This loss is indeed very likely to happen and be huge since the share price of the bank in a moment 
of financial distress is almost certainly lower than the conversion price set at the bond issue 
(Öfinger 2012). The fixed conversion price, while limiting the risk of share price manipulation, 
also reduces the incentive for shareholders to avoid the risk of the trigger breach (Avdjiev & 
Kartasheva 2013). This mechanism was used in the first CoCo issuance by Lloyds Bank in 
November 2009, which was a lower Tier 2 instrument, and had a price equal to the volume-
weighted average price of its ordinary shares for the five consecutive trading days from 
November11 to 17, 2009 (Maes & Schoutens 2012; Von Furstenberg 2011a). 
 
3. Floored Conversion Price: 𝐶𝑃 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆
∗, 𝑆𝐹) 
This method, is a combination of the previous two, since the price is set equal to the price 𝑆∗, 
which is the market price at the moment of the conversion, but only if this price is not lower than 
a pre-specified price floor 𝑆𝐹. 
This option prevents excessive dilution of the shares, reduces the violation of the 
subordination of the pre-existing debt since CoCos can suffer a substantial haircut when the market 
price 𝑆∗  is smaller than the floor price  𝑆𝐹 . The bondholders do not have to take on all the 
uncertainty of stock price deriving from a pre-specified conversion price, even if in the in most 
cases the conversion price is expected to be higher one, corresponding to an effective write-down 
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(Wilkens & Bethke 2014). This method was first used by Credit Suisse in February 2011, with a 
floor price equal to 20 CHF or 20 USD,  and is the most common used in AT1 CoCo issuances (De 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2014a). 
 Principal write down 
Another possibility for banks to absorb losses and increase the level of common equity is to 
operate a write down on the face value of the bond. This loss absorption mechanism can be used 
by banks that have no listed shares such as Rabobank, but it is also adopted by banks with shares 
that are publicly traded on the stock markets as, for example, UBS or Barclays.  
According to De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2014a), this write down can occur in three ways: 
1. Full Write Down 
In this case, if the triggering capital ratio breached, the nominal value of the bond is 
completely written off and lost for the investor, and becomes equity of the issuing bank. 
2. Partial Write Down 
The first CoCo bond of this kind was issued by Rabobank in 2010, had a haircut of 75% and 
reimbursed 25% of the face value at the trigger. The written-off amount can also be at discretion 
of the issuer. 
3. Staggered Write Down 
This mechanism consists in a principal loss that occurs up to the point where the breach on 
the capital trigger is solved. This type of write down is flexible and depend on the size of the bank’s 
distress, since the amount of principal written off corresponds to how much is needed to reach back 
the trigger point. 
 Trigger event 
The second key feature in the design of CoCos is the definition of the trigger event, i.e. the 
situation that automatically activates the loss absorption mechanism and that hence represent the 
potential loss for the investors. 
According to De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011), an effective CoCo trigger event should be: 
- Clear: Carry the same message whatever the jurisdiction of the issuer. 
- Objective: The conversion mechanism must be set at the issuance date and presented in the 
prospectus  
- Transparent: The event should represent the real conditions of capital. 
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- Fixed: The trigger cannot be changed during the bond’s lifetime. 
- Public: The trigger event must be knowable by everyone. 
Triggers can be single or multiple, in which case the breach of any of them activates the 
conversion mechanism. Generally, the trigger event is contractually defined in the prospectus, but 
the resolution authority is free to impose conversion, if it consider the institution to be in a critical 
situation. 
Previous literature on CoCo bonds distinguishes different ways to establish the trigger point, 
some related to bank’s specific events and others linked to more systemic financial distress. Despite 
the several trigger structures explored in literature, so far in real issuance the triggering has been 
linked to accounting ratios (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2009).  
 Bank specific trigger 
Bank specific triggers as suggested by Flannery (2009), subordinate the bond conversion or 
write-down only to negative economic conditions of the issuing financial institution. 
Among the advantages of this kind of triggers, the incentive for prudential behavior of 
management and shareholders and the focus in the single institution’s capital needs. To accomplish 
the contingent capital task, the trigger must activate conversion while the bank is still a “going 
concern”, i.e. before entering a situation of severe distress (Pennacchi et al. 2011). On the 
disadvantages side, the fact that the trigger may be insufficiently responsive to systemic risk 
(Pazarbasioglu et al. 2012). 
Among the bank-specific triggers several options can be distinguished, some linked to 
accounting ratios and some linked to market based indicators. 
2.2.5.1.1 Capital ratio-based trigger 
Under this mechanism, the conversion of the bond into equity is linked to the health of the 
bank’s balance sheet.  The loss absorption happens in the case that the CET 1 ratio, falls below a 
certain value, which can be pre-specified in the bond prospectus or in any case, according to the 
CRD IV cannot be lower than 5.125%.  
On the pros, capital ratio triggers prevent speculation on the stocks that could happen with a 
share price based trigger, when approaching to the conversion price. In this sense, it prevents an 
undue recapitalization of the bank due to market manipulation. An accounting trigger like the CET1 
ratio, guarantees transparency and objectiveness to investors willing to assess the bank’s capital 
distance from the trigger. On the other hand, this kind of triggers are widely criticized for their 
dependence on accounting techniques which are “likely to overstate the market value of a distressed 
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firms’ equity” (Von Furstenberg, 2011b).  Another negative point of accounting-based trigger is 
that the financial statements are published only quarterly, so there is some kind of time lag between 
the actual state of the capital and the one stated on financial reports (Pazarbasioglu et al. 2012). 
This timing problem and the reliability of the flexing rules was evident during the 2007 
financial crisis when some institutions, which were financially in trouble, were still qualified as 
stable and well capitalized. According to Kuritzkes & Scott (2009) indeed, the five largest US 
financial institutions that failed or were forced into government-assisted mergers in 2008 -Bear 
Stearns, Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia and Merrill Lynch- had better capital-
ratios than the standard requirements. 
Despite these negative aspects, the capital ratio is the most used mechanism in real issuances 
of CoCos, and for what concerns the Additional Tier 1 CoCos, which is the type of CoCos that is 
analyzed in this thesis, the capital ratio trigger is the conversion method legally required under 
Basel III framework. As we have already seen indeed, these kind of instruments originate 
specifically in order to allow banks to meet the capital requirements imposed by Basel III.   
- The timing of conversion 
An important aspect to consider about capital ratio triggers, is the level (of CET1/RWA) at 
which the loss absorption mechanism takes place. The level set is important for the regulator, for 
the issuing institutions and for investors. 
Since the conversion or write-down must be activated while the distressed institution is still 
viable, the regulator set a minimum level for the trigger. The CRD IV determined this minimum 
level, required for CoCos to qualify as AT1 capital in a CET 1 ratio of 5,125%. As a consequence, 
the developing trend among financial institutions is to set the trigger exactly at that level even if 
they are free to impose higher trigger (Avdjiev & Kartasheva 2013) 
Banks generally prefer low trigger CoCos since it postpones the recapitalization and its 
negative signaling effect for the market. A low trigger also allows banks to collect cheaper Tier 1 
capital, since lower probability of conversion implies lower required spreads from the investors 
with respect to high trigger levels. The trigger level influences the type of investor interested in the 
bond. Conservative, long-term investors will prefer low trigger CoCos since the risk of conversion 
is limited, while speculative, high yield investors will go for high trigger CoCos. As Avdjiev & 
Kartasheva (2013) found, as of 2013 low trigger bonds offer only a 2.5% excess return with respect 
to non-coco subordinated bonds, while for high trigger this spread is of 3.6%. 
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On the opposite with respect to banks, the regulator prefers high trigger, which would start 
the recapitalization before the distress situation is really critical and while the bank is still in “going 
concern”. This would stabilize the bank situation with the main contribution of the private sector 
instead of the taxpayers, ensuring AT1 capital effectively accomplish the role it has in the 
regulator’s intention. High triggers hence seem to be more prudential but still they present some 
negative aspects for the issuing institutions. In addition to be more expensive for banks they could 
also lead to a premature conversion that would imply negative effects for initial shareholders, since 
the dilution effect would act even if it is still unnecessary. 
The choice of the trigger level for banks depends thus on the trade-off between regulatory 
requirements and more favorable cost of financing. 
2.2.5.1.2 Market-based trigger 
Many researchers, among which Flannery (2009) and Goodhart (2010) for instance, are 
skeptical about accounting-based triggers, because of the lack of transparency and of timing 
consistency of accounting ratios. To overcome these problems, the option proposed in literature, 
which is preferred by the academic world is that convertibility must be associated to market values, 
such as share or CDS price (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2011; Von Furstenberg 2011a).  
Among the advantages of a market-based trigger, we find that the trigger breach does not 
depend on managers’ honesty or on regulators’ thoughtfulness. Moreover, market values are 
forward looking, while accounting measures are based on past elements and they are slow in 
displaying changes in the issuer financial condition (Pazarbasioglu et al. 2012). Market prices 
reflect the financial state almost instantaneously because share prices and CDS spreads are 
continuously requested and incorporating off-book information are more accurate representation 
of the true equity value especially in the event of financial crisis, when managers have convenience 
to overstate banks consistency and solvability (Öfinger 2012). In addition market triggers are 
preferred by investors because they are easier to price. 
On the other hand, also market-based triggers present some negative aspects, which are the 
main reasons why despite being preferred by the academic world, they have not become a 
regulatory standard. The main point against market triggers is that they are vulnerable to market 
manipulation. Trigger may be activated if, for example, a certain market player sells a huge amount 
of shares when the price is already trading close to the trigger barrier. A large decline in stock 
prices happened for instance in May 6, 2010 in the United States, during the so-called Flash Crash 
event. That day due a large fundamental trader that via a “Sell algorithm” and to high frequency 
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trading, more than 20,000 trades across more than 300 securities were executed at a price that was 
over 60% away from their values just moments before (U.S. CFTC. U.S SEC 2010). In the cases 
like this one, or even in less extreme situations, an unjustified short-selling of banks shares could 
activate the conversion trigger without the existence of a real financial distress. A fall in shares 
price will increase the risk of conversion for bondholders and the dilution risk for existing 
shareholders, turning into more sales and activating a downward price spiral. This phenomenon, 
analyzed by Hillion & Vermaelen (2004), is defined as Death Spiral, since the self-reinforcing 
downward movement can end in a conversion not justified by the underlying financials. In addition 
to manipulation, other market distortions like prices volatility, investors’ panics or other market 
pricing errors might trigger undue bond conversion. 
Undue conversion risk can be mitigated by setting the trigger at an average share price. For 
example, by imposing the conversion at the triggering of an average of 5 to 10 consecutive days’ 
share prices, short sellers would have to maintain their positions for a longer period of time 
(Flannery 2009; De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2011). Still the lack of confidence in market efficiency 
and reliability explains the tendency of regulators to prefer account-based triggers.   
2.2.5.1.3 Regulatory trigger  
With this kind of trigger mechanism, the conversion or write down of the bond is activated 
by a decision of the government. This trigger, also called discretionary or point of non-viability 
(PONV), reflects the supervisor’s negative judgment about the issuing bank’s solvency prospects. 
The inclusion of this trigger clauses in AT1 CoCos is due to regulatory capital eligibility 
requirements (Avdjiev & Kartasheva 2013). 
On the pros, this modality allows the regulator to overcome the problem of timing gap or 
unreliability of book-value trigger and also of the risk of market manipulation linked to market-
based triggers. However, on the cons, the discretion given to the supervisor makes the trigger 
activation less clear and predictable both for issuers and for investors, deeply reducing the 
marketability of the bond. The funding costs for the issuer might increase since the investors may 
charge a premium for the uncertainty (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2011; Avdjiev & Kartasheva 
2013). Moreover, being a non-automatic mechanism, the supervisor judgment and discretion might 
increase the negative signaling problem of recapitalization (Pazarbasioglu et al. 2012) 
 Systemic trigger 
Systemic triggers, as opposite to bank specific triggers, do not aim at preventing the financial 
distress of a single institution but rather address “system-wide risks that can build up across the 
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banking sector as well as the pro-cyclical amplification of these risks over time” (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision 2011b). The goal of these triggers is to strengthen the resilience, and 
increase the capitalization of the entire financial industry in the case of a systemic crisis. The 
systemic trigger can be linked either to some market crisis indicators, as for instance loss rates or 
indexes, or to regulatory declaration of systemic crisis. While providing the financial system with 
huge amount of capital in times of crisis, systemic triggers remove the incentive for banks to 
efficiently manage risk in case of low capital ratio, since the triggering event does not depend on 
their specific situation. 
Systemic trigger imposed by the supervisor may generate the so-called first troubled bank 
problem, which consists in the fact that the first institution that is experiencing financial distress 
cannot access its contingent capital resources until the regulator or the market index forces all banks 
to recapitalize. That moment may be too late for the first bank and consequently the regulators have 
an incentive to declare systemic crises too early. On the contrary, uncertainty and shareholders 
aversion for conversion pushes regulators to a recapitalization delay. It is historically ascertained 
that regulators tend to delay too much recapitalization in order to reduce negative signaling to the 
market and to avoid generating a general lack of confidence. 
A market based systemic trigger as an index could seem more reliable, since it is always 
disclosed, opened to the public and very difficult to manipulate through short-selling. On the other 
hand, the index must represent the entire financial industry and since every crisis is different, it is 
impossible to find a “correct” index that exactly anticipate the beginning of the crisis. The use of 
inappropriate trigger would expose the financial system to a huge risk since it would trigger CoCos’ 
conversion either too early or too late. 
To sum up, the two main problems related to the systemic trigger are the risk of wrong timing 
in systemic crisis declaration from the regulator and the fact that once the conversion is activated, 
the recapitalization happens for all the institutions with no distinction, thus penalizing the stable, 
well capitalized banks. To overcome this problem, researchers as Flannery (2009), McDonald 
(2013) or the Squam Lake Working Group (2009) suggested a dual trigger option, a combination 
of a systemic trigger and of a bank-specific one.  
 Two part trigger 
Another suggestion from literature about the optimal CoCo design is the possibility of using 
two triggers on the same instrument, preventing risks linked both to the single institutions and to 
the entire financial system. According to Pazarbasioglu et al. (2012), the dual trigger mode allows 
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implementing a broad-based recapitalization of the banking system still guaranteeing 
differentiation among banks. These solutions that take into account both micro and macro risk 
measures are proposed as an improvement of the options presented above (Veiteberg et al. 2012). 
Supporting this view, McDonald (2013) presents a study for contingent capital with dual 
market trigger. His claim converts bond into equity based on market prices, and specifically, when 
bank’s own stock price falls sufficiently and only if, at the same time, also a given broad financial 
stock index falls below an established trigger value. In this way, conversion occurs when the bank 
is performing poorly in a distressed financial industry environment but allows a bad bank to fail 
when the rest of the industry is in a good situation.  
Similar to McDonald (2013) proposal is the one by the Squam Lake Working Group (2009), 
a pool of 15 non-affiliated leading financial academics that also suggested the conversion shall 
happen if two conditions are met. The first requirement is the declaration of systemic crisis by the 
regulator and the second is the violation of covenants contained in the security contract, which they 
identified in the bank’s capital adequacy, measured by its CET1 ratio (French et al. 2010). Support 
to this proposal, comes from a Rajan (2009), who slightly modifies the Squam Lake Group 
proposal, suggesting that the systemic trigger should be activated by some objective indicators, 
such as aggregate bank losses, rather than by regulator’s will. Here again the bank-specific trigger 
activates on an accounting basis, when the bank’s capital ratio falls below a certain value 
(Calomiris & Herring 2011). 
Having analyzed the different trigger proposals from literature, and said that the CRD IV 
imposes a trigger based on the capital ratio, the next section will introduce some pricing models 
existing in literature and will set down the valuation methodology used in this thesis. 
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3 THE VALUATION FRAMEWORK 
3.1 PRICING ISSUES 
Finding the correct value for Contingent Convertible instruments is a complicated task. 
Different proposals and methods were elaborated both in the academic and in the professional 
world around contingent convertibles since their very first appearance on the capital markets. 
Nevertheless, the continuous evolution and large variety of non-standard features of these hybrid 
bonds, make it difficult to find a comprehensive and definitive approach (Deufel et al. 2011). 
In this section, we are going to briefly discuss the principal pricing issues and we will 
introduce the so-called Rock-bottom spread model from J.P. Morgan, which is the starting point 
for our extended framework. The extension will aim to adapt the 2006 version on financial hybrids 
to the new regulatory context and to the new and specific features required to CoCos to be included 
in Additional Tier 1 capital under the CRD IV. 
The first CoCo bond was issued in 2009 by Lloyds, and was quite different from the AT1 
CoCos that boosted the contingent capital market in the very last years. The Lloyds 2009 CoCo is 
classified as Tier 2 capital, has a fixed coupon, a capital ratio trigger of 5% and a maturity of 10 
years. This instrument is very different from the securities described in the previous chapters and 
the valuation method varies significantly for the two instruments. Most pricing existing model are 
focused on this first type of CoCo, having a fixed non-cancellable coupon and a defined maturity, 
and thus tend to focus only on the conversion risk. The main issues related to conversion are in 
quantifying the value of the shares the investor will receive upon conversion. This is a function of 
the market share value at the trigger time and of the conversion price set in the prospect. 
Other uncertainties complicating the valuation of Additional Tier 1 are related to the coupon 
payment streams, which are at full discretion of the issuer and to the undefined maturity of the 
security. The high heterogeneity of this asset class makes the modelling of a standard consistent 
framework something puzzling and far from being achieved (Henderson Global Investors 2014).  
In addition to that, since these instruments originated as a response to the Basel III regulation, 
they are very sensitive to changes in the bank’s capital requirements. In fact, the constant evolution 
of financial system regulation, could make the already issued instruments no more compliant with 
legal requirements, thus modifying their risk profile and expected return when already in 
possession of investors. This phasing out is exactly what happened with old style Tier 1 hybrid 
bonds which were considered as Tier 1 capital before the new rules of Basel III. These old-style 
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Tier 1 bonds, which failed to protect banks during the crisis, were perpetual callable bonds with a 
step-up mechanism after the first call date. This feature strongly stimulated issuers to call the bonds 
and many operators considered them as fixed maturity bonds. The removal of the step-up feature, 
eliminating the incentive to call, enhances the perpetuity characteristic of AT1 capital changing the 
relevant time horizon in the securities’ valuation (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2014a). 
More uncertainty around AT1 instruments, according to the Global Credit Research (2015) 
by J.P. Morgan, could be added by the trend towards higher triggers for AT1 Cocos in the European 
banking sector. If this trend is respected, although having a good impact on the sector, it will have 
a more uncertain impact on outstanding AT1 contingent debt (since it would be no more compliant) 
and could lead to unexpected outcomes not priced in the market (J.P.Morgan 2015). 
For the reasons above, pricing models may need to be frequently modified to adapt to the 
regulation changes. Nevertheless, since the prospected strong growth of this asset class and since 
this complexity and evolving nature of this under-researched market can give rise to attractive 
investment opportunities,  having a tool allowing to find a “fair  price” for Cocos is a relevant 
matter for high yield securities investors (Henderson Global Investors, 2014).  
While, at the date, the loss absorption triggers in real issuances are linked to the CET1 ratio, 
most existing models on pricing Cocos are based on substituting the accounting trigger with a 
triggering stock price. All these models imply high correlation between stock price and capital 
ratio, which is historically inconsistent, and do not consider the banks’ ability to control the ratio 
through their risk management. Some proposals with accounting triggers and conversion to shares 
are presented below, with a focus on assumptions on capital ratio and stock prices co-movements 
(Veiteberg et al. 2012). Among the existing models we are going to briefly present the credit 
derivatives approach, developed by De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011), which models the recovery 
rate at conversion, based on the ratio between the market share price at the moment of conversion 
and the conversion price, set in the prospectus, at which the investor effectively pays the shares. 
The credit derivatives approach is based on a fixed income investor’s perspective, seeking 
the extra yield on top of the risk free rate required to face the risk of support losses. This starts from 
a reduced form approach, which establishes the relationship between the spread, the recovery rate 
and the probability of default (λ) of the bond according to the following equation: 
𝑐𝑠 = (1 − 𝑅) × 𝜆 
Moving from this relation, the model considers the trigger event as some kind of special case 
of default event. Obviously, we have that   𝜆𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 > 𝜆, since we assume that the trigger event 
33 
 
will take place before the institution defaults and thus has a higher probability to materialize. The 
required spread hence becomes: 
𝑐𝑠𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 = (1 − 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜) × 𝜆𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 
The recovery rate of the contingent convertible depends on the conversion price into shares, 
as already seen in section 1.2, so the only missing part, according to De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 
(2011), is the probability of the trigger event. Since estimating 𝜆𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 reveals to be a complicated 
task, this approach assumes that stock prices move in an equivalent way as capital ratio and thus 
replaces the accounting trigger with a market-based value. By doing this, the trigger probability 
can be modeled in a Black–Scholes setting. We presented this model, since based on its results on 
the recovery rate for the same securities we study, we will set our assumption about their possible 
recovery rate. 
3.2 THE ROCK-BOTTOM SPREAD FRAMEWORK 
The so-called rock bottom spread model is a valuation framework developed by Peter 
Rappoport (2001) from J.P. Morgan Securities, to value the significant additional exposures that 
many bonds present in addition to plain government bonds, namely credit and liquidity risk. 
In 2006, Henriques, Goulden, and Granger, from J.P. Morgan Credit Research, adapted this 
model to financial hybrids, and specifically to bank’s Tier 1 bonds, the regulatory ancestor of 
Additional Tier 1 Cocos, which this master thesis aims to fairly value. Henriques et al. (2006) 
valuation framework allows taking into account the non-standard features of Tier 1 bonds, namely 
the subordination, the coupon deferral and the extension risk. 
In this thesis, we will adjust the framework to value the new features of AT1 Cocos deriving 
from the changes in the regulatory environment. The new framework developed will take origin 
from the basic Rock-bottom spread mechanics (Rappoport, 2001a), will include the changes made 
by Henriques et al. (2006) and will be modified and extended in order to be test on some recent 
European banks CoCo issuances. 
 Overview of the framework 
As the original valuation framework for corporate hybrids, the model is based on the 
calculation of the present value of a set of cash flows in order to find out a fair price, and thus fair 
spread, for the financial hybrids.  However, the specific and not standard features of these 
instruments makes the calculation far more complicated that it would be with plain vanilla bonds. 
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CoCos structure indeed, generates a huge amount of uncertainty around the effective 
instrument’s cash flows, and the probability of the missed payment of coupons and the probability 
of the activation of loss absorption mechanism have to be included in the derivation of the fair 
value of these securities.  
The main output of this valuation model is, indeed, the rock-bottom spread, which represents 
the lowest amount that an investor need to be paid to bear the credit exposure. Any lower spread 
from the security would not compensate enough for the additional risk. This spread reflects three 
pillars on which the model is based:       
1. Credit Fundamentals: the credit quality and views on credit trends over the bond’s life the 
probability as represented by ratings; 
2. Credit Returns: the expected cash-flow, the maturity and seniority ranking of the bond; 
3. Risk Tolerance: the rate of return the investor requires for taking risk, expressed by the 
information ratio. 
These elements will correspond to a certain required spread, which is independent from any 
market influence. This allows then, to compare the spread found out according to the model and to 
the credit valuation of the issuing institution, with the spread that the market is offering for the 
same bond, so to make more informed purchase decisions based upon the model’s results.  
There are two main and most important assumptions that are made in the construction of the 
framework. First, the probability of the cash flows being received by investors is assumed to be 
linked to the financial state of the issuing institution. Secondly, the model assumes that the financial 
state of the issuer is represented by its ratings. Linking each CoCo risk feature to a corresponding 
rating of the issuer means associating each risk event and the connected expected cahsflows to the 
Credit Fundamentals: 
Probability of credit quality change 
Probability of default / recovery rates 
Portfolio Diversity 
 
Rock-bottom spreads 
Risk Tolerance: 
Information ratio  
 
 
Credit Returns: 
Discounted cash flow pattern 
 
 
Figure 5. Rock-bottom spread model pillars. Adapted from (Rappoport 2001b). 
35 
 
underlying financial state of the issuer. Given these assumptions on the link between ratings and 
future cash flows, we have to build a probability distribution for the issuer rating state and thus for 
its possible financial situation. The medium adopted to determine the empirical evidence of the 
probability of being in each rating state is the rating transition matrix. This matrix represents the 
historical chance for each institution with a given initial rating to change or maintain its rating state 
over a certain period, one year in our case. This method provides us with a forward looking 
probability distribution of the rating transition of the firm and to estimate the likelihood of receiving 
a certain cashflow from the instrument issued by the firm (Henriques et al. 2006). 
The three factors composing the model and determining the rock-bottom spread will be 
discussed, with special attention to the way they were modified with respect to the original 
framework to better fit the valuation of Additional Tier 1 CoCos.  
 Credit fundamentals 
Credit fundamentals concern the potential losses that the investor is facing when investing in 
a certain security. These potential losses depend on the actual and future credit quality of the issuing 
institution, which reflects in its probability of downgrading and default.  
 Credit migration matrix 
As said, one of the crucial assumptions in the basic valuation framework and in our adjusted 
version, is that the financial condition of the bonds’ issuing firms can be represented through their 
ratings. Standard and Poor’s defines issuer credit ratings as their “forward-looking opinion of a 
company’s overall creditworthiness to pay its financial obligations” (S&P 2014). According to that, 
changes in the credit quality of the issuers are predicted following what is empirical evidence about 
senior ratings migration, as reported in credit transition matrices. According to Schuermann (2007), 
this method is common practice in several risk management applications, among which portfolio 
risk assessment, pricing of bonds and credit derivatives.  
Many examples of the use of transition matrices as a cardinal input of valuation models can 
be found in previous literature, as for instance in the Markov chain based risky bond pricing method 
by Jarrow, Lando & Turnbull (1997) or in the credit derivatives pricing model from Kijima and 
Komoribayashi (1998). This approach is also used in credit portfolio models as showed by Gupton, 
Finger, & Bhatia (1997) in their CreditMetricsTM framework, which calculates bond prices and 
assesses credit risk assuming asset returns to be normal distributed and to be linked to the issuing 
firm’s rating states. Given these assumptions and the likelihoods derived from the transition matrix, 
it is possible to compute every asset return threshold corresponding to a specific credit rating 
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(Bangia et al. 2002; Crouhy et al. 2000). This relation is represented in Figure 6, where the 
horizontal axis represents a BBB firm’s assets value. 
 
The examples reported in Figure 7, show the probability for respectively, an A, AAA, and 
BBB rated institutions to be in the same or another rating class by the end of the year. A first 
general rule is that the sum of the likelihoods must be equal to 100 % since these represent all the 
possible “states of the world” for the changes in issuers’ credit quality. Taking the first example, it 
can be seen that, according to historical data, an A rated institution has 91.05% probabilities to still 
be an A rated company at the end of the year and 5.52% likelihood to be downgraded of one notch, 
thus becoming a BBB rated firm, always on a one year time interval. 
Instead of representing the quality migration probabilities separately for each rating, it is 
common practice to use transition matrices, which indeed result in square table of probabilities.  
The market of the migration matrices in the U.S. is dominated by Moody’s Investors Services 
and by Standard & Poor’s, which yearly publish studies about the default probability ad the rating 
migration. Because of their broader coverage, Moody’s and S&P data have been used in several 
published studies (Jafry & Schuermann 2004). For the same reason we will use a transition matrix 
Figure 7. Examples of credit quality migration on a one-year horizon (Gupton et al., 1997). 
Figure 6. Model of a value firm and migration (Gupton, Finger, & Bhatia, 
1997). 
37 
 
adjusted from the yearly matrices published by Standard & Poor’s Rating Services in their Annual 
Global Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions. From now on, the S&P ratings 
nomenclature is going to be used. 
There are several different kind of matrices and several aspects to consider when choosing 
the most suitable matrix for purpose. Hereafter we will discuss some of these aspects and give a 
rationale for choices made in this thesis. 
First, the dataset originating the matrix must be analyzed. The matrices by S&P are generated 
using the Standard & Poor’s CreditPro database, which contains, as of year 2013, the issuer credit 
ratings history for 16857 companies that were first rated in the period from December 31st, 1980 
to December 31st, 2013. They include both US and non-US industrials, banks and other financial 
institutions and real estate companies. The matrices can be created on a country, region or on an 
industry basis. This separation is quite important, since the probability distribution or rating 
transitions may vary in a significant way depending on the group of institutions under observation 
(S&P 2014).  
In order to capture credit quality, the ratings composing the matrix must be related to the 
issuer, as credit events normally concern firms as a whole. Since ratings are generally related to 
specific debt, S&P perform some steps to create a corporate matrix. First, bond ratings are 
converted into issuer rating by taking the long-term senior unsecured rating, since they do not carry 
any additional risk to the issuer credit risk. Second, issuers are grouped into economic entities, this 
allowing making a correct rating attribution taking into account parent-subsidiary links, mergers 
and acquisitions and similar corporate structures (Bangia et al. 2002). 
Matrices can count 8 or 18 different rating states, depending if the rating modifiers +/- are 
included or not. S&P yearly calculates both types of matrices, and both of them present positive 
and negative aspects. The 8 categories matrix, for instance, provides larger sample sizes for each 
rating category which reduces the risk of incurring in statistical errors, that, as outlined by Bangia 
et al. (2002), could happen when using the 18 states transition matrix because of the small number 
of issuer in the lower rating categories. Nevertheless, since 2002, the dataset has significantly 
increased, reducing this problem and leaving with the positive aspect of using an 18 rating state 
matrix, which consists in having a greater accuracy and granularity of determining the issuers 
financial condition. The 18 states matrix in addition to the rating modifiers +/-, includes the Default 
state (D) and the “not rated” state (NR). Default is treated in transition matrices as an absorbing 
state, which means that once a firm goes into default it is removed from the sample. What emerges 
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from bankruptcy and could be represented as a migration from D to another rating state is instead 
typically considered as a new firm. Another rating category that is present in the 18 states transition 
matrix is the “not rated” state (NR), which is formed by firms that were normally rated at the 
beginning of the year and whose rating is withdrawn at the end of the same year. There are several 
reasons for a firm to end up in the not rated status and dealing with them is a quite complicated 
task. What is evident is that no credit quality can be associated with the NR state and hence the 
probability of ending in that class must be somehow distributed to the other rating categories. There 
is far less evidence instead why a specific firm ends up in the “not rated” category. According to 
Gupton et al. (1997) and to S&P (2014), ratings are withdrawn when an entity entire debt is paid 
off or when rated debt issuance programs are terminated and relevant debt is extinguished. 
Otherwise, rating can be withdrawn as a consequence of firms mergers or acquisitions. A “bad” 
transition to NR occurs instead, when there is a lack of cooperation and transparency especially 
when a firm is experiencing financial troubles and refuses to provide all the information required 
to come out with a certified rating, or when due to deterioration of the credit quality the entity itself 
decides to bypass an agency rating (S&P 2014). Due to this high uncertainty on rating withdrawals, 
there are different proposals regarding how eliminate the NR category from the matrix. 
In the literature there are at least three methods. The first method is conservative and assumes 
the NR as a negative information with respect to the credit quality of the issuer. The probability of 
transition to NR class is distributed among the downgraded and defaulted states proportionally to 
their values. The second method is liberal and treat the NR status as positive, allocating thus the 
probability of transition to NR to all other ratings, except for the default status, proportionally to 
their values. The third method, that has emerged as an industry standard is to treat transition to NR 
status as a neutral information thus allocating the probability of transition proportionally to all the 
others categories (Bangia et al. 2002). 
Another variable that changes in transition matrices is the time horizon, since matrices can 
be estimated for any desired time horizon. The shortest horizon is potentially a quarterly transition 
matrix, since financial statements and ratings are updated on a quarterly basis. However, it has to 
be said that generally one-year transition matrices are used since shorter matrices have not been 
published by agencies yet. In the figure 8, an example of the 8-states migration matrix is reported. 
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From Figure 8 we can figure out a characteristic common to all migration matrices, namely 
the high probability load on the diagonal, which means that firms are most likely to keep their 
current rating through one year, and have the second highest probability to move in the direct 
neighborhood to the diagonal. A decreasing trend in probabilities can be observed getting away 
from the diagonal, a phenomenon that has been addressed as monotonicity (Bangia et al. 2002). 
For what concerns our framework, some adjustments have to be made on the transition 
matrix, in order to get the more suitable forecast of credit quality migration for the banking firms.  
The matrix we are going to use, as said, will be taken from the annual Standard & Poor’s 
reports about default and credit quality because of the availability of the data. In particular, we will 
take the “Financial Institutions” matrix, which is computed only based on the financial sector. This 
point is important since probabilities significantly vary from an industry to another.  
Related to the number of rating categories we chose the 18-state migration matrix because it 
allows a greater granularity in bond pricing. This will allow us to have more rating categories to 
calibrate the different triggers of the bond affecting expected cashflows –namely the extension, the 
coupon deferral and the conversion or write-down- to a certain financial condition of the issuing 
bank. Having the rating modifiers allows differentiating the trigger rating for bonds having a 
different conversion trigger rate (generally 5.125% or 7% CET1 ratio) or a different combined 
required buffer. Using the 18-states matrix, we have to deal with the NR state, as discussed above. 
We will in this case adopt, contrarily with the industry standard, a negative interpretation of 
withdrawn ratings since given the uncertainty about the reason of the withdrawal and of the 
concerns about the effect of the bail-in regulation on rating migration we prefer to assume a 
prudential and conservative position to avoid the risk of over-evaluating CoCos. The migration 
horizon we are going to use is one year, since the bond price will be obtained by backward 
calculation, discounting cashflows year by year. Actually, the coupon payment of the analyzed 
Figure 8. Example of one year migration matrix, based on S&P histories, 1981-2004 (Schuermann 2007) 
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bond are paid on a quarterly or semiannual basis, so the most correct way would be to use quarterly 
migration matrices. Nevertheless, for a matter of simplicity we approximate coupon as annual 
payments, so to use the one-year transition matrix, which is the shortest time horizon for published 
matrices. 
Most previous studies use a one-year matrix that is the average of the matrices from 1981 to 
the study date. However, we propose a different approach since the changes in banking regulation 
that occurred after the 2008 financial crisis strongly affected the perception about the credit quality 
of financial institutions. New rules made necessary a negative review of credit ratings assigned by 
the agencies and introduced a more strict regulation of the banking sector and of the rating industry 
(Chennells & Wingfield 2015). The most important legislative change imposed by the European 
Union is the switch from the ‘bail-out’ system to the ‘bail-in’ one, a subject we have already 
discussed in the introductory paragraph. This procedure, that has become officially operating in 
January 2016, changes the credit view on financial institutions even for their senior rating, since 
before this regulatory change, a government support uplift was added to the bank standalone credit 
rating. In a default event the government would have rescued the insolvent bank and repaid its 
creditors (State Street Global Advisors 2015). Nowadays the situation has changed, the credit risk 
connected to a bank is more independent from the State it belongs to and entirely lies on its debt 
holders. All this translates in negative implications for the ratings that do not benefited anymore of 
the uplift for potential government support (Standard & Poor’s 2012).  
Since the crisis and the consequent regulation affected the rating attribution methodology, 
we suggest taking as observation period the years going from 2010 to 2013. We compute then the 
average one-year migration matrix for this period. Although this will give us a smaller observation 
period, we consider that taking only the post crisis era, provides us to more precise forecast about 
rating migrations.  
The last adjustment made to the transition matrix used in this thesis is the correction of the 
default row in order to make default probability increase monotonically as suggested by Henriques 
et al. (2006). For some historical anomalies that the BB and B+ rated companies have higher 
probability of default than their respectively one grade higher rated firms, namely the BB+ and 
BB-. In order to keep the sum of transition probabilities equal to one, the part added to the default 
probability is removed from the just above rating state for the considered column.  
The matrix used as starting point for this framework is shown in Figure 9. The matrix is 
transposed with respect to the Standard & Poor’s original one, and is to read from top-down. 
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 The diversity score 
The effect of potential losses on investor’s choices is not only influenced by the credit quality 
and the probability of default, but also by another factor, which is not linked only to the issuing 
institution, but also to the investor’s general strategy. This element is the so-called diversity score, 
a theoretical measure originally created by Moody’s to estimate the diversification of a portfolio 
and to assign credit quality ratings to Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO). This measure, 
slightly modified in J.P. Morgan’s 2001 Rock-bottom spread model is taken into account in the 
framework’s, since the diversification of an investor’s portfolio influences the exposure to credit 
risk that this investors will be prepared to bear. In fact, a high diversity score will translate in 
smaller rock-bottom spread required while a smaller diversity score, making the investor more risk 
averse, will result in a higher required spread. The purpose of this metric is to evaluate the extent 
to which it is likely that default events of the issuers present in the portfolio occur as correlated 
circumstances instead of as independent events (Di Bartolomeo 1998). The computation 
methodology takes into account the issuers and the industry concentration in the analyzed portfolio 
and incorporates assumptions on default correlations, converting that portfolio of correlated 
exposures in a smaller number of independent exposures (Moody’s Investor Services 2007). 
Moody’s assumes that there is high correlation between issuers in the same industry, thus having 
a very small number of equivalent independent exposures, but that there is zero correlation across 
industries so that the diversity scores of the bonds in each industry are summed up into the portfolio 
diversity score (Rappoport 2001b). According to the original J.P. Morgan Rock-bottom spread 
model, the diversity score we will use in our extended version is 70. This number is the diversity 
score offered by the entire US High Yield corporate sector, and means that even if there are over 
Figure 9. 18-states Financial Institutions credit migration matrix. Adjusted from S&P 
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1000 issuer that are rated as speculative-grade, they provide the same diversity as 70 issuers with 
independent asset values. A diversity score of 70 represents hence, a fully diversified investor 
holding a portfolio equivalent to the entire High Yield US corporate market and corresponds to the 
lowest required spread. The way in which the diversity score is inserted in the calculations, 
reducing the excess return volatility, will be showed in the paragraph 3.2.4  
 Credit Returns 
The second point to consider in the framework is the cashflows pattern generated by the 
analyzed bond. What we search is the credit return i.e. the excess return that the corporate bond 
(AT1 CoCo), is expected to provide over an identical government bond. The cashflow pattern of a 
corporate bond is different from the one of a sovereign bond, since the first one has a certain 
probability to default. The corporate bond should hence provide an additional return, in the form 
of a spread over government return to compensate the investor for the uncertainty about the actual 
cashflows he is going to receive. As figure 10 shows, the two bonds have the same principal and 
the same maturity of one year. They both receive a coupon after one year but since the corporate 
bond faces the possibility of a default, it will pay a spread over the government 5% coupon.  
Figure 10 illustrates the easiest case of a one-year bond with two only possible scenarios, 
either the repayment of the bond or the default. When considering more than one year, the 
probabilities of rating changes have to be considered in computing the average credit return. The 
idea behind the use of transition matrices, consistently with the CreditMetrics approach, is to make 
future cashflow pattern dependent on issuer’s rating state, thus a threshold of expected cashflows 
for the bondholder can be created using an adjusted migration matrix as previously described.   
Figure 10. Cashflow scenario for a one-year corporate bond (Rappoport, 2001c) 
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Figure 11, on based on Rappoport (2001a), represents the possible credit scenarios for a 3-
years BBB rated bond and the related cashflows. Every state of the transition matrix has a certain 
cashflow associated with it and according to the initial senior rating, the probabilities of migration 
for the next year are established. Discounting the cashflows backward to the actual date, we find 
the price resulting from different credit scenarios and hence establish the credit return of the bond.  
To quantify this rock-bottom spread we have to define one more element, which is related to 
the risk premium required by the investor as a compensation for bearing the default risk. This risk 
tolerance measure will be introduced in the following paragraph (Rappoport 2001a). 
 Risk Tolerance 
The investors risk aversion of the can be measured through the information ratio, a ratio that 
was first exposed by Jack Treynor and Fisher Black in 1973 (Schaffner 2010). This metric is useful 
to isolate the excess return per unit of risk taken (Kidd 2011). 
The information ratio is basically a volatility-adjusted excess return since it describes the 
relationship between the excess return over the benchmark and the volatility of this excess return. 
The information ratio is expressed by the following equation: 
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑏]
√𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑏]
 
where 𝑅𝑖  is the return of the coco bond and 𝑅𝑏  is the return of the benchmark. The 
denominator term √𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑏] stands for the standard deviation of the tracking error, which is 
the difference between the return of the bond and that of the benchmark.  
Figure 11. Example of a 3 years scenario for corporate bond (Schaffner 2010). 
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The importance of the information ratio in the adjusted rock-bottom spread framework, 
according to Rappoport (2001), derives from the fact that it is interpreted as the asset’s performance 
target that an investor requires in order to accept the risk of holding a given security, a contingent 
convertible in this specific case. The target ratio is chosen by considering alternative investment 
opportunities, since it would be nonsense to pursue a strategy that produces a lower information 
ratio than other possible alternatives, so having less return for unit of risk. In the case of bonds the 
excess return considered is the credit return (Rappoport 2001b).  
In the model, the target information ratio will influence the maximum price an investor will 
buy the Coco bond, and thus the credit spread that he requires for investing in that. Pricing the bond 
in this way, ensures the fact that the obtained eccess return will be related to the one obtainable by 
investing in other opportunities of outperforming government bonds. 
According to Henriques et al. (2006), the target information ratio we will assume is equal to 
0.5, which is something that has become a standard in the industry. Several studies have analyzed 
the distribution of the information ratios obtained by active fund managers in different historical 
periods finding a sort of scale of ratios. As mentioned by Kidd (2011) and according to Grinold & 
Kahn (1996) and Goodwin (1998), empirical evidence on before-fee information ratios offers the 
results reported on Figure 12. Although the results may change somewhat by time period, by asset 
class or by fee level, the following figure represents an overall reliable distribution of ratios. 
An adjustment that must be done, when passing from a single asset to a portfolio or index is 
to reduce the volatility, dividing it by the diversity score √𝑑. This provides us with the reduced 
volatility, which expresses the fact that the hydiosincratic risk of a single asset is reduced when 
this security is introduced in a diversified portfolio. The adjusted equation is the following one: 
𝐼𝑅𝑎 = 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑏]
√𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑏]
√𝑑
 
Figure 12.  Ranking of Information Ratios (Cameron, 2009). 
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The information ratio, obtained by introducing the diversity score at the denominator, 
provides us with the target excess return over unit of risk, and thus the minimum spread that a fully 
diversified investor will ask to introduce a certain Coco bond in his portfolio. As we will se in the 
next paragraph, this equation is the starting point for the rock-bottom spread calculations since it 
includes the credit returns as well as the measures of risk aversion that characterize our investor. 
In our framework we will use the Sharpe ratio, which is a particular case of information ratio, 
where the benchmark is represented by the risk free asset. 
 Computing Rock-Bottom spreads 
In this section, we will show the algebraic calculations to compute the rock bottom spread, 
the lowest spread the investor requires to bear the credit risk of holding a corporate bond.  
Following J.P. Morgan’s framework we first have to compute the rock bottom price. We 
will then compute the spread, through a conventional price-to-yield calculation.  
To simplify the methodology understanding, we will show procedures and computations 
with a standard bond, contemplating only two possible credit scenarios “default/no-default”, and 
with an 8-state corporate transition matrix. The complex features of AT1 CoCos will be later 
introduced, once the model mechanics are clearly stated. Related to the target performance, the 
information ratio will be set, for the reasons earlier explained, equal to 0.5. In the example, we 
consider the financial 8-state matrix in Figure 13, with time horizon of one-year calculated as the 
average of the period going from 1981 to 2014, adjusted from S&P (2015).  
 
For what concerns the bond instead, we start by considering a one-year senior unsecured 
bond, which has only the default/no-default possible scenarios. The inputs used for the example 
(except from the matrix) are taken from Rappoport's (2001) original valuation framework and are 
reported in the table below:  
Figure 13.8-states transition matrix. Adjusted from (S&P 2015). 
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Example inputs  
Default/Downgrade probability As in figure 14 
Face value 100 
Recovery rate 45% 
Coupon 8% 
Information ratio 0.5 
Diversity score 70 
Discount rate 6% 
                                           Table 5. Example valuation inputs. From Rappoport (2001a) 
 In this case, hence, the credit scenarios for a one-year period are: 
The value of the bond depends on how likely each scenario is expected to realize. We then 
compute the average price, i.e. the expected future value between the two possible scenarios using 
the following formula for all the 7 possible ratings (we do not consider the “D” state): 
𝐸[𝐶𝐹𝑖] = 𝜇𝑖  = (1 − 𝑝)(𝐹𝑉 + 𝐶) + 𝑝(𝑅) 
where p is the probability of default, FV the bond face value, C the coupon and R the 
recovered amount in case of default. The probabilities for each scenario, used in this example, are 
taken from the matrix in Figure 13. 
𝜇𝐴𝐴𝐴 =∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
= (
1 ∗ 108 +
0 ∗ 45
) = 108 
𝜇𝐴𝐴 =∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
= (
0.9996 ∗ 108 +
0.004 ∗ 45
) = 107.97 
. 
𝜇𝐶𝐶𝐶 =∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
= (
0.7973 ∗ 108 +
0.2027 ∗ 45
) = 95.23 
As expected, the prices are decreasing going from the higher to the lowest rating category 
of the issuer. To obtain the rock bottom price another important factor we need is the volatility of 
No Default   $108  
Default         $45  
1-p 
p 
𝜇𝑖 
t=0 t=1 
Figure 14. One-year bond credit scenarios 
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the bond prices, which we obtain (for the “default/no-default” case), via the following formula: 
𝑠𝑑𝑖 = √[(1 − 𝑝)(𝐹𝑉 + 𝐶)𝑖
2 + 𝑝𝑅𝑖
2] − 𝐶𝐹
2
 
which in a multiple scenario case, becomes: 
𝑠𝑑𝑖 = √∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
2
𝑠
𝑖=1
− 𝜇
2
 
Back to our example, we compute thus the volatility of prices for the different ratings. 
𝑠𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴 = √∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
2
𝑠
𝑖=1
− 𝜇
2
= √(1 ∗ 108
2 +
0 ∗ 452
) − 1082 = 0 
𝑠𝑑𝐴𝐴 = √∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
2
𝑠
𝑖=1
− 𝜇
2
= √(0.9996 ∗ 108
2 +
0.0004 ∗ 452
) − 107.972 = 1.26  
 . 
𝑠𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶 = √∑ 𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
2𝑠
𝑖=1 − 𝜇
2
= √(0.7973 ∗ 108
2 +
0.2027 ∗ 452
) − 95.232 = 25.33  
To obtain the rock-bottom price we first have to set the relation it has with the target 
information ratio. Since the performance depends on returns, it also depends on prices for the 
reason that the reservation price is the one that allows the investor reaching his target performance. 
The benchmark we take for computing the information ratio in this example is a risk-free 
investment in government bond, which following Rappoport (2001) example is equal to 6%. We 
want hence to write an equation for rock bottom price in function of expected future cashflows, 
their volatility and of the information ratio. 
We start from the Information Ratio formula (without considering diversification for the 
moment) as expressed in the previous paragraph: 
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓]
√𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓]
 
We have that 𝐸[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓] is the excess return of the bond over the government bond, which 
we call also the credit return in scenario and√𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓] is the volatility of the excess return 
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over the government bond in scenario. Anyway, since we are interested in considering every 
possible scenario the information ratio we are interested in is:  
𝐼𝑅𝑎 = 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
=  
𝐸[𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑓]
√𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑓]
 
First, we deal with the average credit return across scenarios. This corresponds to the 
(expected) difference between the average bond return and the government return, which we 
assume to be constant across scenarios. This is expressed as follows: 
(
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
) =  
(
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠
) − (
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 )
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
− (
𝑔𝑣𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡
)
=
(
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠
)
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
− (1 +
𝑔𝑣𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡
) 
Which can be also written as: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑓] =
𝜇𝑠 − 𝑥
𝑥
− 𝑅𝑓 =
𝜇𝑠
𝑥
− (1 + 𝑅𝑓) 
Where 𝜇𝑠 corresponds to the average price at the (s) rating state, x is the current price of the 
bond and 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free return of a government bond.  
At the denominator of our information ratio formula, we have the credit return volatility, 
which is just the price volatility across the different scenarios divided by the current price. 
(
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
) =  
(
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠
)
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
Government returns, which we assume to be constant and risk free, have volatility equal to 
zero, so they disappear from the denominator. 
√𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑓] = 𝑠𝑑[𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑓] =
𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑥
− 𝑠𝑑(1 + 𝑅𝑓) =
𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑥
 
We now put together these two parts of the information ratio and write: 
𝐼𝑅𝑎 =
𝜇𝑠
𝑥 − (1 + 𝑅𝑓)
𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑥
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Through some easy algebraic calculations, we express the current price as function of future 
prices and their volatility, of government returns and on the information ratio. Setting the 
information ratio equal to the investor target performance and incorporating the diversity score, we 
are finally able to obtain the rock bottom price for a bond held in a diversified portfolio. 
(
𝑅𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
) =
(
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠
) − (
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
) ∗ (
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠
√𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
)
(1 + 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)
 
Rewriting with the symbols: 
𝑅𝑏𝑝 =
𝜇𝑠 − 𝐼𝑅𝑎 ∗
𝑠𝑑𝑠
√𝑑
(1 + 𝑅𝑓)
 
Having found average scenarios value at t+1 (𝜇𝑠) and the bond volatilities 𝑠𝑑𝑠 , we can 
now plug these data into the rock bottom prices equation to find the maximum amount the 
investor would pay for the one-year bond according to the rating category of the issuer. 
 𝑅𝑏𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴 =
𝜇𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 𝐼𝑅𝑎 ∗
𝑠𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴
√𝑑
(1 + 𝑅𝑓)
=
108 − 0.5 ∗
0.00
√70
1.06
= 101.89 
𝑅𝑏𝑝𝐴𝐴 =
𝜇𝐴𝐴 − 𝐼𝑅𝑎 ∗
𝑠𝑑𝐴𝐴
√𝑑
(1 + 𝑅𝑓)
=
107.97 − 0.5 ∗
1.26
√70
1.06
= 101.79 
. 
𝑅𝑏𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶 =
𝜇𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐼𝑅𝑎 ∗
𝑠𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶
√𝑑
(1 + 𝑅𝑓)
=
95.23 − 0.5 ∗
25.33
√70
1.06
= 88.41 
At his point we can easily compute the yield of the bond given its rock bottom price via a 
standard excel price-to-yield calculation. The formula used is the following one: 
(
𝑅𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
) =  
(
𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
100 +
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) − (
𝑝𝑎𝑟
100 + (
𝐴
𝐸 ∗
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦))
𝑝𝑎𝑟
100 + (
𝐴
𝐸 ∗
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)
∗
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ∗ 𝐸
𝐷𝑆𝑅
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where A is the number of accrued days, i.e. from the beginning of the coupon period to the 
settlement date, E is the number of days in the coupon period and DSR is the number of days from 
the settlement date to the redemption date. Subtracting from the yield calculated this way, the yield 
of the risk free investment, we finally obtain the rock bottom spread. 
𝑅𝑏𝑠𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑏𝑝 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑓 = 6.00% − 6.00% = 0 𝑏𝑝𝑠 
𝑅𝑏𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑏𝑝 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑓 = 6.10% − 6.00% = 10𝑏𝑝𝑠 
 
𝑅𝑏𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑏𝑝 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑓 = 22.16% − 6.00% = 1616𝑏𝑝𝑠 
As expected, the premium required by the investors is increasing when moving to a lower 
rating category of the issuer. The mechanism showed can be repeated for longer maturities, 
performing backward calculation and using the rock-bottom prices found for one-year as expected 
value of the cashflows for the previous year (adding the coupon to these prices). The most important 
difference is that not only two credit scenarios are possible, but all the rating states have to be taken 
into account as a possible future scenario, with the probability given by the rating migration matrix. 
The average expected value after one year of the two-years bond is calculated as below: 
𝜇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡=1 =∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
=
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.8955 ∗ (101.89 + 8)
0.0977 ∗ (101.79 + 8)
0.0039 ∗ (101.68 + 8)
0.0008 ∗ (101.47 + 8)
0.0008 ∗ (100.93 + 8)
0.0004 ∗ (99.22 + 8)
0.0008 ∗ (88.41 + 8)
0.000 ∗ (45) )
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 109.86 
 
𝜇𝐴𝐴𝑡=1 =∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
=
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0054 ∗ (101.89 + 8)
0.8996 ∗ (101.79 + 8)
0.0892 ∗ (101.68 + 8)
0.0043 ∗ (101.47 + 8)
0.0003 ∗ (100.93 + 8)
0.0003 ∗ (99.22 + 8)
0.0004 ∗ (88.41 + 8)
0.0004 ∗ (45) )
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 109.75 
. 
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𝜇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡=1 =∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
=
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 ∗ (101.89 + 8)
0.0000 ∗ (101.79 + 8)
0.0000 ∗ (101.68 + 8)
0.0000 ∗ (101.47 + 8)
0.0196 ∗ (100.93 + 8)
0.1862 ∗ (99.22 + 8)
0.5915 ∗ (88.41 + 8)
0.2027 ∗ (45) )
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 89.87 
As before, we now compute the volatility of expected values across credit scenarios two 
year to maturity at the end of year one. 
𝑠𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡=1 = √∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
2
𝑠
𝑖=1
− 𝜇
2
= 
√
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.8955 ∗ (101.89 + 8)2
0.0977 ∗ (101.79 + 8)2
0.0039 ∗ (101.68 + 8)2
0.0008 ∗ (101.47 + 8)2
0.0008 ∗ (100.93 + 8)2
0.0004 ∗ (99.22 + 8)2
0.0008 ∗ (88.41 + 8)2
0.2027 ∗ (45)2 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
− 109.862 = 0.39 
 
𝑠𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑡=1 = √∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
2
𝑠
𝑖=1
− 𝜇
2
= 
√
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0054 ∗ (101.89 + 8)2
0.8996 ∗ (101.79 + 8)2
0.0892 ∗ (101.68 + 8)2
0.0043 ∗ (101.47 + 8)2
0.0003 ∗ (100.93 + 8)2
0.0003 ∗ (99.22 + 8)2
0.0004 ∗ (88.41 + 8)2
0.0004 ∗ (45)2 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
− 109.752 = 1.19 
. 
. 
𝑠𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡=1 = √∑𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖
2
𝑠
𝑖=1
− 𝜇
2
= 
√
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 ∗ (101.89 + 8)2
0.0000 ∗ (101.79 + 8)2
0.0000 ∗ (101.68 + 8)2
0.0043 ∗ (101.47 + 8)2
0.0003 ∗ (100.93 + 8)2
0.1862 ∗ (99.22 + 8)2
0.5915 ∗ (88.41 + 8)2
0.2027 ∗ (45)2 )
 
 
 
 
 
 
− 89.87 = 19.07 
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Again, plugging these results into the rock bottom price equation and converting it into the 
yield we can obtain as before the rock bottom spread. 
𝑅𝑏𝑠𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡=0 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑏𝑝 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑓 = 6.02% − 6.00% = 2 𝑏𝑝𝑠 
𝑅𝑏𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑡=0 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑏𝑝 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑓 = 6.10% − 6.00% = 10𝑏𝑝𝑠 
 
𝑅𝑏𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡=0 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑏𝑝 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑓 = 18.47% − 6.00% = 1216𝑏𝑝𝑠 
The method shown for a two years bond can be reiterated by backward calculation for an 
infinite number of times and can thus be adapted to all possible maturities. Rappoport (2001) and 
Schaffner (2010) in their respectively creation and adjustment of the rock bottom spread 
framework, determined the shape of the spread term structure by calculating for longer maturities 
the rock bottom spreads of a bond similar to the one of the example here introduced. 
Having provided an insight on the original rock-bottom spread framework for plain vanilla 
bonds, the next section will introduce some adjustments to this methodology in order to value the 
specific risks of AT1 CoCo bonds. 
3.3 THE ADJUSTED MODEL 
All Additional Tier 1 CoCos have some key characteristic that influence the expected cash 
flow for the investor and that hence have to be included in the model. The extension and the coupon 
cancellation features already existed for hybrid bonds since their first issuances and have already 
been discussed in valuing corporate hybrids or “old style” bank Tier 1 debt. The conversion feature 
instead, a new characteristic that emerged with Basel III regulation for Additional Tier 1 debt, has 
not been taken into account in previous elaborations of this framework and is the trickiest aspect 
to value because of the high uncertainty about stock price evolution after the conversion. As for 
plain vanilla, the expected cash flows depend on the financial state of the issuer, as represented by 
the migration matrix, so, keeping the same tree discounting structure, the cash flows have to be 
adapted for all the possible scenarios originated by these features. As said, the matrix used in the 
extended model will be an 18 states matrix to be able to better differentiate the different scenarios. 
The rating state used to represent the financial condition, which thus triggers the different events, 
is the issuer senior rating, which represents credit fundamentals. Ratings take into account factors 
like capital solidity, asset quality, profitability and business risk, but given the high correlation of 
all these factors we think reasonable to use them as a proxy for capital ratios. Another difference 
from the example proposed above, is the discounting rate, which will be based on real forward 
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curves instead of assuming the simplified flat government yield curve. In this section each feature 
will be reviewed in detail and based also on Henriques, Goulden, & Granger (2006), some 
assumption will be made on the rating state of the issuer triggering each of these risky events and 
on the cash flow corresponding to that situation.  
 Subordination 
The word subordination refers to the hierarchy of debt instruments for what concerns the 
repayment of their holders in the event of default. As we have seen, in the capital structure of banks, 
Additional Tier 1 CoCos rank directly ahead of equity (ordinary and preferred shares) for 
reimbursement priority of the bank capital structure. These bonds are also called junior 
subordinated bonds because they come after, in terms of seniority, not only to senior secured and 
unsecured bonds, but also to the other forms of subordinated debt, i.e. to upper and lower tier 2 
instruments. For this reason, according to Henderson Global Investors (2014) the recovery rate 
could be very low in case of distress. The standard recovery rate assumed in the CDS market for 
senior debt is 40%, while according to Schaffner (2010), Moody’s calculates an issuer-weighted 
average corporate debt recovery rate (1985-2009) of 31.3% for subordinated debt a and 24.7% for 
junior subordinated bonds. Anyway, the novelty of financial regulation regarding the bail-in 
mechanism that is in effect since January 2016 and the features of Additional Tier 1 instruments, 
suggest assuming lower recovery rates. More precisely, since CoCos is converted into equity or is 
written down in case of financial distress it may seem not overly pessimistic to assume for the 
Cocos holders a recovery rate of 0% in the event of default. This zero recovery rate view is 
consistent with Henriques et al. (2006) assumption for “old style” Tier 1 debt which still was not 
as risky as Additional Tier 1 Cocos. 
 Coupon cancellation 
Another assumption is made to associate a certain rating state of the issuer to the event of 
coupon cancellation, i.e. on the decision from the issuer not to pay the regular coupon associated 
to the hybrid security. Including the possibility of a coupon cancellation in the framework is 
important because this event changes the future streams of cashflows for the bondholder, 
influencing the present value of the bond and thus the spread required. 
The deferral mechanism can be activated in two ways. The first way in which the coupon can 
be deferred or cancelled, is the mandatory deferral, i.e. the obligation for the bank not to pay the 
coupon in the case of breaching buffer capital requirements. This is achieved by establishing a 
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Maximum Distributable Amount, which is the maximum amount that can be distributed in 
dividends and AT1 coupons payments. The second chance to have a coupon deferral is for 
voluntary initiative of the issuer, to prevent the triggering of the mandatory deferral. These two 
possibilities will occur in different financial situations of the issuing institutions and thus have to 
be associated with two different rating states.  
 Mandatory Coupon Cancellation 
As seen in section 2, among the novelties of Additional Tier 1 after Basel III introduction, 
there is a more strict regulation of coupon payments. In this new regulatory framework, banks are 
prevented from paying coupons over the MDA when they are violating the Combined Buffer 
Requirements, in order to avoid further undermining their regulatory solvency. 
For modelling reasons we have thus to establish a rating in which the bank is violating the 
combined buffer requirement and it is forbidden to make any distribution to its AT1 bondholders.  
Looking at previous literature, Henriques et al. (2006) established for old Tier 1 instruments 
that the minimum regulatory solvency (which at that date was Tier 1 Capital equal to 4%) used to 
correspond to BB+ rating, i.e. the first rating class below the investment grade ratings. This 
assumption was made based on the example of Banca Popolare Italiana case, which in February 
’06 was downgraded to Baa2 (S&P BBB) by Moody’s with a capital ratio of 5.5%. J.P. Morgan’s 
analysts decided hence to set the coupon deferral trigger at the senior rating of BB+, since 
regulation imposed the deferral at the breach of the minimum capital solvency.  
Nowadays with the increasing capital requirements, a capital ratio of 5.55% would translate 
in a much lower senior rating (close to triggering the conversion), thus the association between 
BBB rating and 5.55% capital ratio is no more realistic. An example of this fact, is given by one of 
the issuers we will analyze, BBVA, which with a Tier 1 ratio of 12.30% as of September 2015 has 
its long-term senior debt rated BBB. In the same way, the BB+ association to 4% capital holds no 
more, since minimum capital requirements have been raised significantly and a 4% capital would 
now be associated with a much more critical rating. In other words, we think that a BB+ rating for 
base case of around 10% Combined Buffer Requirement today reflects a better solvency situation 
of the bank. Adopting J.P. Morgan model’s assumption, we suggest that this rating can still be 
associated to the higher level at which the breach of capital requirements induces to the non-
payment of the AT1 coupon. 
Another analysis to do, as performed in Lambert (2014), is to compute the amount of 
combined buffer requirement for each bank by summing up the buffers that the regulation will 
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require on a different basis to every single institution according to its size and its systemic 
importance. According to this, we think the rating trigger for coupon cancellation should vary 
between BBB- and BB rating grades, the minimum CET1 requirements ranging from 11% to 8%. 
 Voluntary Coupon Cancellation 
A bank can also elect not to pay coupons as a voluntary choice, even if the minimum 
requirement is not breached, in the case for example that the bank is experiencing a loss or it has 
not enough resources to distribute. This modality of coupon cancellation is far more complex to 
represent within this framework according to the modalities described, because it does not depend 
on the rating profile but can suddenly arise as a choice of the bank’s board of directors as a response 
to an unexpected event. Obviously, the probability of this phenomenon to happen is expected to 
increase in lower rated institutions but still it is difficult to associate it to a certain credit rating 
grade (Henriques et al. 2006). 
According to Lambert, Villalobos, & Theodore (2014) from ScopeRatings among others, the 
voluntary coupon cancellation is actually expected to be a very rare event since it would have a 
negative effect on debtholders and as a consequence a boomerang effect on the creditworthiness of 
the coupon cancelling institution. In fact, a voluntary choice of not paying coupons could have high 
hidden costs for the issuer especially in terms of reputation and on future access to credit market.  
This view on voluntary coupon cancellation is supported by two empirical examples that 
Henriques et al. (2006) report in their framework for old Tier 1 capital instruments. These examples 
are related to the already cited BPI (in 2005) and to HVB (in 2004) that even though reporting 
material losses at the end of the financial year, decided and clearly communicated to the market 
that would not have deferred the payment of their Tier 1 coupons. A more recent example of this 
view on voluntary deferral can be found in the words of John Cryan, co-chief executive of Deutsche 
Bank who, in October 2015, was assuring markets that his bank would have plan to pay all 
dividends on its additional tier 1 securities and that coupon payments are senior to stock dividend 
payments (Hale & Mccrum 2015). 
According to that, we will assume that a voluntary coupon deferral will happen only in 
extreme cases at a very low rating and in any case lower than the one activating the mandatory 
deferral. This is consistent also with Cuadrado's (2013) statement that mandatory deferral is 
potentially much riskier than the voluntary one. 
To sum up, the assumption of coupon deferral will be that this event is triggered by a financial 
condition represented by a rating going from BB+ to BB-, which are at the boundary of the 
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investment and non-investment grade in the 18-state credit migration matrix, according to the 
individual Combined Buffer Requirements of each single bank. 
Figure 15, adapted from Henriques et al. (2006), shows how the coupon cancellation may 
affect the expected cashflows, still using the same 8-state transition matrix: 
 Extension/Callability risk 
Old-style Tier 1 hybrid bonds used to have a maturity date and had a set-up spread on the 
coupon stream after the first call date, so were mainly expected to be called at the first occasion. 
Nevertheless, the bank was not forced to call these bonds, this generating uncertainty about 
effective maturity and on the stream of expected cashflows.  
Additional Tier 1 CoCos are perpetual securities and the step-up clause is no more allowed, 
so no incentives are provided to the bank to redeem these securities. Still the bank has the 
possibility to choose whether to redeem the bond or not at any call date. This generates uncertainty 
in investors’ expectations in their forecasts about a possible coupon deferral over a longer horizon 
of time and about the value of the variable coupon set after the first call date. 
Getting into cash flows, the bond calling would reflect in the expected payment of the par 
value plus the coupon. The extension of the bond would instead reflect in the expected perpetuity 
value of the bond added of the coupon value if the rating of the bank suggests the coupon will be 
paid, according to what we assumed about the coupon cancellation trigger. 
The assumption to make for the valuation framework is related to the rating state that will 
make preferable for the bank to redeem to CoCoo. As seen in chapter 2, new CRD IV allows banks 
the redemption of existing Coco bonds only if immediately replaced with the exact corresponding 
amount of these same instruments so remaining compliant with the minimum requirement amount 
for Additional Tier 1 capital. The rationale for the choice between calling and extending is to be 
A 
Figure 15 Expected cashflows adjusted for coupon deferral. Modified from J.P. Morgan 
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found in the financing costs that the bank is facing in the two alternative cases. Provided that, 
according to Dutordoir, Lewis, Seward, & Veld (2014), European investors tend to see contingent 
convertibles as an extension of bond market, and thus generally expect these instruments to be 
called, we see the issuer choice to be influenced mainly by other factors. The elements to consider 
are indeed the credit market general conditions, the IRS rate and the credit quality it has at the 
issuance date. If the conditions of the credit markets are expected to worsen, with less demand of 
Cocos for example, or if interest rates such as IRS, LIBOR are expected to raise, the costs of 
refinancing will be higher. This fact could make it preferable for banks not to call the security even 
if the variable coupon they will have to pay after the call date is probably higher than the fixed one 
paid in the time period preceding in the first call date. 
The other aspect we will consider regarding this choice is the credit quality if the issuer at 
the call date. The premium that an institution has to pay on its debt issuances highly depend on the 
creditworthiness the market is assigning them. Together with CDS, senior credit ratings given by 
rating agencies are a primary attribute that investors are using as a descriptor of the creditworthiness 
of a bond issuer, especially when these indicators announce a decrease in credit quality (Hull et al. 
2004). Also, the relation between ratings downgrades and bond prices reduction is shown to be 
positively correlated by previous research studies (Katz 2014). According to this, we set a 
triggering rating grade at which the banks credit quality makes it too expensive to refinance debt 
on credit market with respect to maintaining the already existing debt instruments. The most logical 
assumption is that the bank will decide to call the Cocos and refinance, if its credit rating at the 
first call date is equal or above the credit rating at issuance.  
A lower credit rating would mean a higher yield required by investors. The effect of the 
callability option on the bond cashflows is illustrated below: 
A 
Figure 16. Expected cashflows adjusted for call option. Modified from J.P. Morgan 
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 Conversion/write-off risk  
Among the assumptions to adjust the model for Additional Tier 1 bonds, the association of 
the loss absorption mechanism (conversion or write-off) trigger to a certain rating and even more 
the establishment of an expected loss at conversion are the trickiest ones. This is due to the high 
uncertainty and unpredictability of the evolution of share price after the breaching of the regulatory 
minimum capital ratio and to the not always defined amount of principal write down. Additional 
tier 1 securities can have either a low conversion trigger (CET1 ratio of 5.125%) or a high 
conversion trigger (CET1 ratio of 7%). This will reflect in different hypothesis on the senior rating 
to associate to the conversion event. For these reasons, we would set the conversion rating for the 
low trigger bonds equal to B, which is the first in the highly speculative rating grades, and which 
we consider being adequate for a bank in a situation of high financial distress, corresponding to a 
capital ratio breaching the minimum requirement. For high trigger bonds, we will set the triggering 
rating, on notch above, thus equal to B+. 
 Conversion mechanism 
For what concerns the expected value of the bond after the conversion, we have to establish 
a recovery rate for the investor having his bond turned into a share. This is the most uncertain point, 
since assuming a realistic share price corresponding to capital ratio triggering the conversion is still 
an unsolved task. In order to do this we are going to lean on the results found by De Spiegeleer & 
Schoutens (2014), who developed a pricing tool based on their credit derivatives approach for Tier 
2 CoCos. In essence, what they do is to replace the CET1 ratio with a barrier stock price as the 
mechanism of loss absorption activation. The recovery rate of a CoCo, according to the authors, is 
given by the ratio between the stock price at the trigger event 𝑆𝑇
∗ , and the conversion price 𝐶𝑝 as 
shown in the following equation (De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 2011): 
𝑅𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 =
𝑆𝑇
∗
𝐶𝑝
 
Generally, the market price in the event of the conversion will be lower than the conversion 
price because of the huge selloff form investors that we can easily imagine to happen when the 
imminent capital ratio breach becomes public information. For this reason, the recovery for CoCo 
holders will be lower than the face value paid for the bond. In any case, to calculate the recovery 
rate 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜, the conversion price 𝐶𝑝 and the market share price 𝑆𝑇
∗  are required.  
Normally, most CoCo prospectuses contain a floored conversion price. The price taken is the 
highest among the market price at conversion, a floor price and the nominal price of the common 
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share at the conversion moment. In this case, the payoff for the coco holder in case of conversion 
becomes: 
𝑅𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 =
𝑆𝑇
∗
max (𝑆𝑇
∗ ;  𝑆?̅?)
 
Assuming a well calibrated floor conversion price preventing from excessive share dilution 
and considering the price death spiral we talked about in chapter 2, we expect the conversion price 
𝐶𝑝 to be equal to the floor price. 
The unknown trigger level, 𝑆𝑇
∗  at which the CoCo converts is given through the return 
dynamics of the credit derivatives model. The implied trigger level will be taken as correct from 
the De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) results on the same bonds we are analyzing, namely the 
BBVA, the Santander and the HSBC. Another approximation we have to do is to consider the 
recovery rate that De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) found related to the call date, to be constant 
for the entire life of the CoCo, so that the triggering price and the conversion price keep a costant 
ratio over years. 
  Write-off mechanism 
For what concerns CoCos with a partial write-down, it is impossible to define the amount of 
the face value written off at the triggering event. In order to make a conservative assumption we 
set the recovery rate of CoCos with write off equal to zero. This is consistent with De Spiegeleer 
& Schoutens (2011) assumption. 
Here below an example of loss absorption trigger is shown for the conversion case: 
The same structure of cashflows can be replicated for a CoCo with write-down, just 
substituting the different recovery rate amount for this conversion mechanism. 
A 
Figure 17. Expected cashflows adjusted for coupon deferral. Modified from Öfinger (2012) 
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Having assumed a corresponding rating state for each of the characterizing features of CoCo 
bonds, we now have a complete overview of the cashflow associated with every rating category 
and, discounting backward from maturity to date, we obtain the current “rock-bottom” price. We 
perform the calculation starting 60 years ahead, which according to Henriques et al. (2006) 
approximates the perpetuity of the bond. We adapt the different coupon rates after the first call 
date, by adding the floating spread set by the issuer to the five years mid-swap, which we update 
at each reset date, normally every five years. The five years mid-swap we use is the forward 
EUSA5, and we discount all the cashflows using the equation seen in the basic framework, with a 
risk free rate equal to the IRS for European banks with the tenor equal to the maturity of the bond, 
i.e. the EUSA 60 years. As before, the prices found for each rating at each year are the average 
across scenarios for that rating grade and are used as inputs for the previous year calculations. The 
spread to call we obtain, is the difference between the bond’s yield to call and the deutsche Bund 
with the closest maturity to the first call date. 
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In Figure 18, we show the backward calculations for a theoretical CoCo issued by an A 
rated institution. As we can see, all the possible states are introduced in the discounting framework, 
following the assumptions discussed above in the previous paragraphs. 
 
Having stated all the assumptions and explained the mechanics of the framework, in next 
chapter these calculations will be applied to six CoCos issued by European Banks between 2014 
and 2015, with the purpose of determining a “fair” credit spread according to the model’s 
assumptions. 
 
𝑃𝐴 
t=0 t=59 T=60 Maturity 
Figure 18. Backward valuation of an A rated institution’s CoCo. Own illustration adapted from  Schaffner (2010).  
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4 VALUING COCOS 
In this chapter, we introduce the financial institutions on whose AT1CoCos the framework 
will be tested. For this purpose, we selected six European banks that issued CoCos compliant with 
the CRD IV between 2014 and 2015, and which have their first call date between 2019 and 2022. 
These Cocos have different contractual terms and the firms have different credit and capital quality, 
which influences the assumptions on ratings and on scenarios in the binomial tree framework. The 
institutions we will consider are the Spanish Banco Santander and BBVA, the British HSBC, the 
Belgian KBC Bank, the Dutch Rabobank and the Italian UniCredit. All the spreads are computed 
as of January 25, 2016. All the relevant information contained in the prospectus for the description 
of each CoCo is in Appendix 1. 
4.1 BBVA 
This CoCo is a low-trigger one since the loss-absorption mechanism takes place at the 
minimum regulatory CET1 requirement of 5.125%. The loss absorption feature is conversion into 
equity at a floored conversion price of € 4.5, which can be modified according to condition 5.4 of 
the Prospectus, in the case of a consolidation, reclassification/redesignation or subdivision 
affecting the number of common shares. 
In table 6, we list the inputs for the valuation framework. 
Model inputs Values 
Default/Conversion/downgrade Probability Adjusted 18-states average annual migration matrix 
for financial institutions (2010-2013) S&P 
Recovery Rate from Default 0 
Recovery Rate from Write-off 44% (source: De Spiegeleer, Schoutens) 
Call Trigger BBB (equal to S&P long-term Senior Rating) 
Coupon Cancellation Trigger BB+ 
Conversion Trigger B 
Coupon to Call 7,00% 
Coupon after Call EUSA 5 +  6,155% 
Information Ratio  0,5 
Diversity Score 70 
Discount Rate EUSA 60 
Risk free benchmark German Bund 1%, 2018 
     Table 6. Framework inputs for BBVA 7% CoCo 
The minimum CET1 required to BBVA not to be restricted on distributions is 9,75%, since 
to the minimum ECB requirement of 9.5% it will be added a 0.25% G-SIB buffer. Given our 
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assumptions we associate to this value the coupon cancellation trigger at the rating BB. The 
conversion trigger of 5.125% corresponds to our base case assumption of triggering rating B. The 
recovery rate is taken from De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) credit derivative approach results 
and assumed constant. Under these assumptions, the CoCo price is equal to € 92.08 corresponding 
to a spread at the first call equal to 1047 basis points (bps). 
4.2 BANCO SANTANDER 
Here again, the conversion mechanism is a Floored price, set by the issuer at € 5.01, adjusted for 
capital actions. Our assumptions for valuation are reported in the table. 
Model inputs Values 
Default/Conversion/downgrade Probability 18-states average annual migration matrix for 
financial institutions (2010-2013) S&P 
Recovery Rate from Default 0 
Recovery Rate from Write-off 33% (source: De Spiegeleer, Schoutens) 
Call Trigger BBB+ (equal to S&P long-term Senior Rating) 
Coupon Cancellation Trigger BB+ 
Conversion Trigger B 
Coupon to Call 6,25% 
Coupon after Call EUSA 5 +  6,54% 
Information Ratio  0,5 
Diversity Score 70 
Discount Rate EUSA 60 
Risk-free benchmark German Bund 2%, 2022 
        Table 7. Framework inputs for Santander 6.25% CoCo 
The floor price is set by prospectus at € 5.01. We expect the share price to be lower than the 
floor when the minimum CET1 ratio is breached, and according to  De Spiegeleer & Schoutens 
(2011) results, we set the recovery rate equal to 33%. The minimum required CET1 for combined 
buffer requirement is 9.75%, so we set the triggering rate for coupon cancellation at the rate BB+. 
The conversion trigger is 5.125%, which corresponds in our framework to a triggering rate of B. 
We value Santander’s CoCo worth € 94.97, corresponding to a required spread of 752 bps. 
4.3 HSBC 
For this CoCo, the conversion is set at the fixed price of € 3.37. Table 8 reports our 
assumptions for valuation. 
Model inputs Values 
Default/Conversion/downgrade Probability 18-states average annual migration matrix for 
financial institutions (2010-2013) S&P 
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Recovery Rate from Default 0% 
Recovery Rate from Write-off 66% 
Call Trigger A+ (equal to S&P long-term Senior Rating) 
Coupon Cancellation Trigger BBB- 
Conversion Trigger B 
Coupon to Call 5,25% 
Coupon after Call EUSA 5 +  4,38% 
Information Ratio  0,5 
Diversity Score 70 
Discount Rate EUSA 60 
Risk-free rate benchmark German Bund, 1.5% 2023 
        Table 8. Framework inputs for HSBC 5.25 CoCo 
Being HSBC a high internationally active bank, it is required to hold more systemic buffers 
to avoid restrictions on distributions. The minimum CET1 it has to hold is 11.4%, which 
corresponds in our framework in a higher coupon cancellation trigger, which we set at BBB-. The 
conversion trigger at 5.125% corresponds to the base case trigger of B. The recovery rate at 
conversion is 66% as estimated by De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) computations. The obtained 
price is € 105.38, which reflects the good credit quality of the issuer, and corresponds to a minimum 
required spread of 420 bps.  
4.4 KBC BANK 
This low-trigger CoCo has a conversion mechanism with write down of its principal value, 
with no shares in exchange for the CoCo holder. The assumptions for valuation are reported in 
table 9. 
Model inputs Values 
Default/Conversion/downgrade Probability 18-states average annual migration matrix for 
financial institutions (2010-2013) S&P 
Recovery Rate from Default 0 
Recovery Rate from Write-off 0 
Call Trigger A- (equal to S&P long-term Senior Rating) 
Coupon Cancellation Trigger BB+ 
Conversion Trigger B 
Coupon to Call 5,63% 
Coupon after Call EUSA 5 +  4,759% 
Information Ratio  0,5 
Diversity Score 70 
Discount Rate EUSA 60 
Rate at Call German Bund,1%, 2018 
       Table 9. Framework input for KBC 5.625% CoCo 
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The minimum CET1 ration that KBC has to hold in order to avoid restriction of distributable 
items is 9.25%. We maintain the base case assumption to its coupon cancellation trigger at the 
rating category BB+. The conversion mechanism being a discretionary partial write off, leaves us 
with high uncertainty about the recovery rate in case of conversion trigger breach. We opt for a 
very prudential assumption of 0% recovery rate, knowing that this is an extreme case, in which the 
banks need all the CoCo nominal value to absorb its capital losses. The write down trigger level is 
5.125% CET1, which corresponds to our base case rating B. Under these assumptions, the CoCo 
price we find is €98.16, meaning a required spread of 671 bps. 
4.5 RABOBANK 
This bond is the only one among the bonds we analyze with a high trigger, since the loss 
absorption mechanism is activated at the CET1 ratio of 7%. The assumptions for valuation are 
reported below. 
Model inputs Values 
Default/Conversion/downgrade Probability 18-states average annual migration matrix for 
financial institutions (2010-2013) S&P 
Recovery Rate from Default 0% 
Recovery Rate from Write-off 0% 
Call Trigger A+ (equal to S&P long-term Senior Rating) 
Coupon Cancellation Trigger BB+ 
Conversion Trigger B+ 
Coupon to Call 5,50% 
Coupon after Call EUSA 5 +  5,25% 
Information Ratio  0,5 
Diversity Score 70 
Discount Rate EUSA 60 
Rate at Call German Bund 0.25%, 2020 
      Table 10. Framework inputs for Rabobank 5.5% CoCo 
The minimum CET1 requirement to avoid restriction on coupon payments for Rabobank is 
9.5%, thus we set the triggering rating for coupon cancellation at BB+. The loss absorption 
mechanism for Rabobank CoCos being 7%, we raise our triggering rating for write-down of one 
notch with respect to low-trigger CoCos. We assume this event happening when the issuer rating 
is B+. We still assume a 0% recovery rate from write-off, keeping this prudential view on the 
securities with discretionary write-down mechanism. The strong credit fundamentals of Rabobank, 
such as its CET1 ratio of 13.2%, which reflect in an issuer rating of A+, lead our framework to 
assess a very high price of €112.86, which in terms of “fair” spread corresponds to 624 bps.  
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4.6 UNICREDIT 
The assumptions for the valuation framework are summarized here below. 
Model inputs Values 
Default/Conversion/downgrade Probability 18-states average annual migration matrix for 
financial institutions (2010-2013) S&P 
Recovery Rate from Default 0% 
Recovery Rate from Write-off 0% 
Call Trigger BBB- (equal to S&P long-term Senior Rating) 
Coupon Cancellation Trigger BB+ 
Conversion Trigger B 
Coupon to Call 6,25% 
Coupon after Call EUSA 5 +  6,10% 
Information Ratio  0,5 
Diversity Score 70 
Discount Rate EUSA 60 
Risk free at call German Bund 2.250%, 2021 
       Table 11. Framework inputs for Unicredit 6.25% CoCo 
The loss absorption trigger being CET1 ≤ 5.125%, we keep the base case assumption of 
corresponding trigger ratio to B. The minimum CET1 requirement for not incurring in distribution 
restrictions is 9.75%, so we keep the base case assumption of triggering coupon cancellation at  
BB+, and once again the recovery rate associated to the write down event is assumed equal to zero. 
The price we find for Unicrdit’s CoCo is very low, and reflects the lower capitalization of the bank 
with respect to its European peers, and the fact that the current rating is BBB- which implies a 
higher probability for negative actions with respect to CoCo holders. The obtained price is equal 
to € 66.92, associated to a minmum required spread of 1600 bps.  
 
In the next chapter, these results will be summarized and the spreads obtained from the 
framework will be compared to the spreads available on the market, both in times of stability and 
of turbulence. The outcomes of the framework and their interpretation with respect to market’s 
spread will be discussed and an analysis of sensitivity of the model to the assumptions will also be 
performed. 
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5 INTERPRETING RESULTS 
In this chapter, we will compare the spreads obtained from the valuation framework for the 
securities presented in chapter 4 with the spreads offered by the market. The aim is to assess 
whether the risk embedded in these bonds is fairly priced according to our view on the credit 
fundamentals of the issuing institutions. The difference between the framework’s spreads (“Rock-
bottom spreads”) and the market spreads, given the market independent model here developed, are 
due to factors that influence market prices beyond the pure credit quality of the issuers as expressed 
by their credit ratings. The following table summarizes the outcome of our analysis.  
Issuer Coupon 
Loss 
absorption 
mechanism  First Call 
Issuer 
Rating 
Bloomberg 
mkt Spread 
Rock bottom 
Spread (bps) 
Excess 
Spread  
(bps) 
Relative 
value 
BBVA 7% Conv. €4,5 19/02/2019 BBB 931 1047 -115 DEAR 
HSBC 5,25% Conv. €3,3 16/09/2022 A 613 420 193 CHEAP 
KBC 5,63% Write-off 19/03/2019 A- 659 671 -12 DEAR 
Rabobank 5,50% Write-off 29/06/2020 A+ 599 264 335 CHEAP 
Santander 6,25% Conv. €5 11/09/2021 BBB+ 810 752 58 CHEAP 
UniCredit 6,75% Write-off 10/09/2021 BBB- 947 1600 -653 DEAR 
Table 12. Results from the valuation framework. Own calculations 
The relation between the framework spreads and the market spreads is plotted in Figure 18. 
At a first sight, the overview illustrates the general plausibility of the valuation framework, since 
considering that all the input parameters and the assumptions made in the valuation framework are 
purely based on credit fundamentals, the results obtained are to a considerable extent in line with 
the market spreads. The credibility of the results is indeed attested by the fact that market spreads 
and framework spreads show a correlation coefficient of 0.91. 
 
                                      Figure 19. Framework spreads vs model spreads. 
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A second point that seems important to notice, is the strong relation between the framework 
spreads and the long-term senior ratings of the AT1 CoCos issuers. This relation is a consequence 
of the fact that credit ratings, representing the credit quality of the issuers, affects through the credit 
migration matrix, the expected cashflow pattern associated to the CoCos. The relation between 
ratings and spreads, even if to a smaller extent, appears to be true also for market spreads. This 
allows us to conclude that the ratings might have a quite important role in influencing bondholders’  
purchasing decisions. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 20. 
 
                           Figure 20. Framework and model spreads vs S&P long-term rating. 
Another general trend that can be seen in the figure above is that the market seems to correctly 
price (according to our results) the CoCos issued by institutions situated in the middle of our ratings 
spectrum, while tend to misprice issuers with considerable high or low rating. In fact, the larger 
excess returns, both positive and negatives, are at the extremes issuer ratings of our analyzed pool 
of CoCos. More precisely, it we obtain that higher rated institutions have their CoCos traded cheap, 
while low rated institutions have their CoCos traded dear. For example, we have, as of January 
2016, that the Coco bond from Rabobank, which is rated A+ was offering a spread of 599 bps 
significantly higher than our framework spread of 264 bps. On the other side, we have that 
Unicredit, whose senior long-term rating is BBB-, has a CoCo that offered a spread of 947 bps, 
while we assess that should offer to the investor a minimum spread of 1600 bps. These results are 
in line with the findings of Henriques et al. (2006) related to old-style Tier 1 financial hybrids. The 
rock-bottom spread methodology, suggest thus that the market is potentially overstating the risks 
linked to CoCos from high rated institutions, while is underestimating the risk connected to CoCos 
issued from low rated institutions. In fact, for what concerns CoCos, the higher fully-loaded CET1 
ratio of Rabobank (11.8%) with respect to Unicredit (10.4%), as of June 2015, provides the 
investors with more confidence that Rabobank will breach the minimum CET1 regulatory 
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requirements associated to coupon cancellation or to CoCO write-down, with far less probability 
than Unicredit.  Having a general view of the overall framework results, we are now going to 
perform a sensitivity analysis of the assumptions to the initial rating, taking as example the 
Santander 6.25% CoCo. 
5.1 SENSITIVITY TO ISSUER’S INITIAL RATING 
Given the strong reliance of our model on credit ratings as a good proxy for banks 
fundamental value, we first analyze how the “fair spreads” we obtain are affected by a change in 
the senior rating of the issuer, that is by a change on its credit fundamentals. We consider here a 
change in rating that happens after issuance, so that it does not affect the rating triggering the 
redemption. As expected, the degree of sensitivity to this parameter is very large, since the current 
initial rating determines the probability to move in each other state. The sensitivity of CoCos to 
starting ratings is much higher than it is for vanilla bond, since it influences the probability of 
different risks to happen and not only the probability of default. Looking at Figure 21 referred to 
the Santander 6.25% CoCo (senior rating BBB+), we can see how the required spread increases 
going down the rating scale, and how also the sensitivity increases for lower ratings, where the 
probability of deferral, conversion and default are higher. 
 
                             Figure 21. Framework spreads sensitivity to issuer initial rating for Santander  
                             6.25% CoCo 
5.2 SENSITIVITY TO COUPON CANCELLATION TRIGGER 
The second assumption we are going to analyze is the trigger for coupon cancellation. 
Changing the assumption of its realization has a large impact on the “fair value” of the CoCo, 
especially around the issuer senior rating, since for a BBB+ rated firm the marginal cancellation 
132 107 146 167 214
314
512
752
991
1448
2368
3088
35763632
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB-
Fr
am
e
w
o
rk
 S
p
re
ad
s 
(b
p
s)
Initial Rating
70 
 
probabilities vary more passing from BBB+ to BBB, than from AA to AA-. As we can see in figure 
22, related to Santander 6.25% CoCo, if we set the coupon cancellation trigger at a high rate, the 
almost certainty of coupon cancellations lowers the bond price and widens spreads. Required 
spreads decrease setting the coupon cancellation trigger at lower levels, as the investor will bear 
smaller risk to have his coupon cancelled. In our framework, this trigger is represented by the 
Combined Buffer Requirement, which establishes the minimum amount of CET1 a bank must hold 
not to be imposed of restrictions on its distributions. 
                    Figure 22. Framework spread sensitivity to changes in coupon cancellation trigger 
                    for Santander 6.25% CoCo. Base case assumption: BB+ 
5.3 SENSITIVITY TO CALL TRIGGER 
The influence of changes in the call triggering rate on spreads does not show a monotonic decrease 
as happened for sensitivity to coupon cancellation. Moving towards high rating triggers, 
corresponding to the almost certainty that the CoCo will not be called, result in decreasing spreads,   
since the high coupon rate and the small probability of its cancellation or of conversion activation 
increases the value of holding the CoCo for longer time horizon. Approaching to lower rating levels 
the positive effect of high coupons is offset by the higher probability of coupon cancellation, 
making the spreads widen. At ratings lower than BBB+, we see the spreads falling again, 
suggesting that for higher default probability levels investors prefer to get the principal back in 
short time, pushes required spreads down again. The illustration of spreads behavior is plotted in 
figure 23, always related to the Santander 6.25% CoCo. 
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Figure 23. Framework spreads sensitivity to changes in call trigger assumptions  
                              for Santander 6.25% CoCo. Base case trigger BBB+ 
5.4 SENSITIVITY TO CONVERSION TRIGGER 
We control here the variation of “fair spreads” with respect to the conversion trigger rating, 
having set the base case assumption to B, which represents a point of financial distress but in which 
banks are assumed to still be able to run their business. We notice, as expected, that the conversion 
at higher rates leads to higher required spreads, while at ratings close to our base case assumption, 
we see that for Santander 6.25% Cocos, having a recovery rate of 33% as computed by De 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011), the notching down or up to the next rating category has very small 
impact. We explain this with the fact that the perpetual bond value at ratings close to conversion is 
similar to the amount in shares the investor would receive. 
 
                                           Figure 24. Framework spreads sensitivity to changes in conversion trigger for 
                                   Santander 6.25% Coco. Base case assumption: B 
5.5 SENSITIVITY TO CONVERSION RECOVERY RATE 
The recovery rate for the investor when the bond is converted into equity is a very uncertain 
issue, since it no case of conversion has happened at the date, and for the difficulty to link the 
market share price corresponding to the triggering capital ratio. We have assumed a constant 
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recovery rate, according to the findings from De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) credit derivative 
approach on the same analyzed securities. Here again the impact on fair spreads depend on the 
issuer rating which influences the probability of conversion. The figure below reports the 
sensitivity for the Santander 6.25% CoCo, which shows a change of around 100 bps for a 10% 
change in recovery rate assumption. For our bonds with write-off mechanism, we assumed a 
conservative 0% recovery rate, given the full discretion of the bank around the write-off size. 
 
                            Figure 25. Framework spreads sensitivity to recovery rates from conversion 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The framework we developed aims at establishing a “fair” spread, based on credit 
fundamentals for AT1 CoCo bonds. The difficulty of this task derives mainly from different 
sources of risk and form the fact that this market is only three years old and that no security has 
already been tested in times of severe financial distress. 
The starting framework being the J.P. Morgan so-called rock-bottom spread model, we kept 
the discounted cash-flow structure, which allows to evaluate every single non-standard feature of 
Additional Tier 1 CoCos, and to easily adapt the framework for testing different securities.  
As the models it borrows from, thus, our framework is based on the assumption that credit 
ratings are a good proxy for credit quality and financial situation of banks, and that the empirical 
credit migration matrix represents the probability of fundamentals evolution, with a special 
attention to capital ratios, in a credible way. Academic literature is ambivalent about ratings utility 
in pricing, nevertheless the transition matrix is a tool often used in assessing credit risk. The main 
issue, represented by the withdrawn rating category, is treated in this thesis in a conservative way 
preferring to slightly raise the probability of a downgrade than to underestimate the risk of a 
negative event to happen. We believe that ratings represent better capital ratios developments, to 
which trigger events for Cocos are linked by regulation, than share price would do.  
The second main critical aspect, in which we find the association to share price unavoidable, 
is the computation of the recovery rate for conversion. To do this, we rely on the implied trigger 
price assumed as found by De Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) through their credit derivative model. 
This implied share price at the triggering event divided by the conversion price gives us the 
recovery rate in the case of conversion. We directly take that ratio from the authors, since it is 
computed on our same securities even if at the first call date, and we make the strong assumption 
that, since the conversion price is adapted by the bank in case of action on stock prices, it will be 
constant for the entire life of the Coco. Discounting the cashflows of six European banks’ CoCos, 
we obtain our “rock-bottom” spread, which is the “fair” smallest spread at which a fully diversified 
and risk averse investor is requiring to accept holding the security. 
The findings we obtained are quite consistent with the ones derived from the original J.P. 
Morgan model for financial hybrids. In times of financial stability, we find, as J.P. Morgan did, 
that high rated banks’ CoCos offer higher spreads than we would require assessing the risk with 
our framework, while we notice that market does not discount enough the risk embedded in lower 
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rated institutions’ CoCos. This originates from the strong influence the framework structure 
attributes to ratings to predict the risk of a contingent capital event to happen. 
  The framework finds credit spreads that are in general not too far from the market ones in 
times of stability of the financial markets. In periods of markets stress, when market spreads are 
influenced by investors’ sentiment and by high volatility, this volatility highly affects Cocos 
spreads due to their riskiness and to the strong equity feature of this new asset class. This 
discrepancy of model spreads from unjustified low or high market ones is explainable by the fact 
that the spreads obtained through the model are almost market independent and solely rely on credit 
fundamentals, that we assume, according to Rappoport (2001) original’s model, being represented 
by credit ratings.  
This reliance to credit fundamentals, in our opinion, may reveal to be at the meantime a 
strength and a weakness of the model. The strength comes from the fact that a transitory market 
sell-off or an unjustified peak do not influence our “fair” spread, providing with a more solid 
opinion of the correct security’s value thus suggesting us the value at which the securities should 
theoretically tend. At the same time, real changes in the macroeconomic context, which could affect 
the fundamentals of the issuing institutions, reflect in our CoCo’s values only after the rating 
agencies change their view on the issuer initial rating. Of course, one could make its own 
conjectures about the credit quality of the issuing bank, but sticking to the mechanics of the rock-
bottom spread framework, the valuation could have some lag with respect to the market 
incorporation of information in prices.  
The main issues are related to the conversion recovery rate for which we assumed as an input, 
the results obtained by De Spiegleer & Schoutens through their credit derivative model spreadsheet. 
These recovery rates, which the authors computed at the first call date, were assumed to be constant 
for every year. The partial write down mechanism is another ambiguous point, since the full 
discretion the issuer has related to the write-off size does not allow to make better assumption than 
a prudential zero recovery rate.  
To sum up, we believe that the framework we have developed here as a useful tool, to assess 
the risks that are embedded in CoCos instruments. It provides an insight to understand how their 
fair spread varies according to the capital and the other fundamentals of the issuers, how it is 
affected by regulatory requirements such as the combined buffer requirements and by design 
features such as the coupon size, the after-call spread, the years to first call and the loss absorption 
mechanism. 
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7 APPENDIX  
Cocos information from prospectus: 
BBVA Security description  
Name Non-Step-Up Non-Cumulative Contingent 
Convertible Perpetual Preferred Tier 1 Securities 
Issuing Institution Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. 
Issuer Rating BBB (as of June 2015) 
Issue size €1,500,000,000 
ISIN XS1033661866 
Maturity Perpetual 
Issue date Feb 19, 2014 
First Call Date Feb 19, 2019 
Coupon Rate 7% until the First Call Date, payable QTL 
Floating After Call Coupon Mid-swap 5Y + 6.155%, Reset date every 5Y 
Loss-absorption mechanism Conversion at par 
Conversion Trigger CET1 Ratio ≤ 5.125% or authority declaring PONV 
Conversion Price (𝐶𝑃) 
 
max (𝑆∗(market price at conversion), € 4.5 (Floor 
Price), € 0.49(nominal value common share)) 
    Table 13. BBVA 7% CoCo data 
 
Santander Security description  
Name Non-Step-Up Non-Cumulative Contingent 
Convertible Perpetual Preferred Tier 1 Securities 
Issuing Institution Banco Santander S.A. 
Issuer Rating BBB+ (as of June 2015) 
Issue size €1,500,000,000 
ISIN XS1107291541 
Maturity Perpetual 
Issue date Sept 11, 2014 
First Call Date Sept 11, 2021 
Coupon Rate 6.25% until the First Call Date, payable QTL 
Floating After Call Coupon Mid-swap 5Y + 5.640%, reset date every 5Y 
Loss-absorption mechanism Conversion at par 
Conversion Trigger CET1 Ratio ≤ 5.125% or authority declaring PONV 
Conversion Price (𝐶𝑃): 
max (𝑆∗(market price at conversion), € 5.01 (Floor 
Price), € 0.49(nom. value common share)) 
   Table 14. Santander 6.25% CoCo data 
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HSBC Security description  
Name Perpetual Subordinated Contingent Convertible 
Securities 
Issuing Institution HSBC Holdings plc 
Issuer Rating A (as of June 2015) 
Issue size €1,500,000,000 
ISIN XS1111123987 
Maturity Perpetual 
Issue date Sept 9, 2014 
First Call Date Sept 16, 2022 
Coupon Rate 5.25% until the First Call Date, payable S/A 
Floating After Call Coupon Mid-swap 5Y + 4.380%, reset date every 5Y 
Loss-absorption mechanism Conversion at par 
Conversion Trigger CET1 Ratio ≤ 5.125% or authority declaring PONV 
Conversion Price (𝐶𝑃): Fixed € 3.37 (GBP 2.70) 
    Table 15. HSBC 5.25% CoCo data 
  
KBC Security description   
Name Undated Deeply Subordinated Additional Tier 1 
Fixed Rate Resettable Callable Securities 
Issuing Institution KBC 
Issuer Rating A- (as of June 2015) 
Issue size €1,400,000,000 
ISIN BE0002463389 
Maturity Perpetual 
Issue date Mar 19, 2014 
First Call Date Mar 19, 2019 
Coupon Rate 5.625% until the First Call Date, payable QTL 
Floating After Call Coupon Mid-swap 5 years + 4.759%, reset date every 5Y 
Loss-absorption mechanism Write-down 
Conversion Trigger CET1 Ratio ≤ 5.125% or authority declaring PONV 
Write-down Partial and temporary 
   Table 16. KBC 5.625% CoCo data 
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Rabobank Security description  
Name Perpetual Additional Tier 1 Contingent Temporary 
Write Down Capital Securities 
Issuing Institution Rabobank B.A. 
Issuer Rating A+ (as of June 2015) 
Issue size €1,500,000,000 
ISIN XS1171914515 
Maturity Perpetual 
Issue date Jan 22, 2015 
First Call Date Jun 29, 2020 
Coupon Rate 5.50% until the First Call Date, payable S/A 
Floating After Call Coupon Mid-swap 5 years + 5.25%, reset date every 5Y 
Loss-absorption mechanism Write-down 
Conversion Trigger 
CET1 Ratio Group ≤ 7% CET1 Ratio Local Bank ≤ 
5.125% or authority declaring PONV 
Write-down Partial and temporary 
    Table 17. Rabobank 5.50% CoCo data 
 
 
Unicredit Security description  
Name Non-Cumulative Temporary Write-Down Deeply 
Subordinated Fixed Rate Resettable Notes 
Issuing Institution UniCredit S.p.A.. 
Issuer Rating BBB- (as of June 2015) 
Issue size €1,000,000,000 
ISIN XS1107890847 
Maturity Perpetual 
Issue date Sept 10, 2014 
First Call Date Sept 10, 2021 
Coupon Rate 6.25% until the First Call Date, payable S/A 
Floating After Call Coupon Mid-swap 5 years + 6.10%, reset date every 5Y 
Loss-absorption mechanism Write-down 
Conversion Trigger 
CET1 Ratio Group ≤ 7% CET1 Ratio Local Bank ≤ 
5.125% or authority declaring PONV 
Write-down Partial and temporary 
    Table 18. Unicredit 6.75% CoCo data  
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